My wife and I regularly took Yeti flights to Lukla as part of our exploration of Sagamartha National Park...we used to joke that they were a mess of an airline...it's so sad to see that it manifested in the worst possible way.
@SagarParajuliOfficial
Жыл бұрын
Hey, besides Yeti, had you taken any airlines or not? If you have, which airline in Nepal do you recommend?
@Rav01508
9 ай бұрын
U mean tara air
@cheeseboiyes._.
2 ай бұрын
@@SagarParajuliOfficialif im correct, buddha air has not experienced much crashes compared to yeti airlines so yeah i recommend buddha air
@anthonyluccini1015
Ай бұрын
The Yeti company is banned and has no right to fly over Europe
@Trevor_Austin
Жыл бұрын
Many years ago we had an incident where almost exactly the same thing happened. A training captain was also in the right hand seat. The pilot in the left hand seat asked for Flaps 40 and the RHS pilot shut down the right hand engine. The LHS pilot, a First Officer undergoing command training, noticed and decided to continue as Flap 25 is the standard configuration for a single engine approach.
@FlywithMagnar
Жыл бұрын
Please show respect to others. Sadly, I have been forced to delete some comments because of harassment.
@mike48084
Жыл бұрын
You should not censure people’s opinions. The point of accident investigations is to prevent future occurrences. I don’t know how you expect to do this when you are spoon feeding your our personal narrative.
@FlywithMagnar
Жыл бұрын
I have deleted libelous comments targeting individuals. There's a clear line between discussing what has happened, and harassing people.
@rubinabhujel4081
Жыл бұрын
I'm from Nepal and you clear us why this accident happened thank you very much
@mike48084
Жыл бұрын
@@FlywithMagnar Keep in mind that not all disputes are destructive. “Malicious compliance” is an actual thing. 90% of accidents could have been prevented by someone just speaking up, and your censorship does not help this at all.
@FlywithMagnar
Жыл бұрын
@@mike48084, let me make this clear: I do not censor opinions. I remove comments that are attacking individuals as persons. This includes racism and hate messages.
@golmatol6537
Жыл бұрын
Great report ... I was a passenger on this very same flight some years ago (absolutely loved this flight ... this ATR was in practically new condition, great service by cabin attendants and really nice views of the Himalayan ranges throughout the flight). It made me really sad when this flight crashed and was anxious about how this could have happened when nothing seemed seemingly wrong.
@petesmith9472
Жыл бұрын
I flew in one of these aircraft a few times just a few days ago with Air New Zealand. I thank you for the sincerity with which you presented this tragedy.
@86FxBdyCpe
Жыл бұрын
Pete, I bet you had a few "butterflies", with this incident fresh in your mind?
@mr.j7566
Жыл бұрын
As a basic aircraft maintenance instructor, I feel proud to say that this video can be a human factors training and I'll surely share the details among the students which would greatly increase their curiosity to learn. It's only through mistakes one can learn max
@kentkopar8069
9 ай бұрын
😊😊😊😊😊😊
@RichardWill-ee9zo
5 ай бұрын
They thought they engine power is a thruster
@gamalmiraj7312
Жыл бұрын
Thank you for the explanation Captain Magnar, did happened to me when I act as PF and realized my FO as PM select CL number 2 instead of flap 30, Immediately put back CL 2 to auto. I believe fatigue was the main issue. Because we’re doing 8 sectors on that time,just scan cross check and confirm we should be okay.
@FlywithMagnar
Жыл бұрын
Thank you for your contribution and feedback! I have heard about a similar incident with a Dash 8. And as in your case, the mistake was discovered within seconds.
@saoraovjoshi
Жыл бұрын
Yes pilot decreased condition lever instead of flaps to 30° Engine turned off fuel supply due to that plane crashed - Cockpit Recorder
@vicvega3614
Жыл бұрын
159,000 ?
@KeithNjenge
Жыл бұрын
@@jonathanhermansson4553 😂😂
@FightPropaganda
Жыл бұрын
@@jonathanhermansson4553it's still fu.cking 10 bucks who were giftet. Humans are stupid these days.
@thenelsonbruhs722
Жыл бұрын
My instructor always tells me “look, then touch”. It helps a lot to avoid reliance on muscle memory when configuring the airplane. That applies to anything. Avionics buttons, bugs, flap levers, mixture, power, breakers. Anything.
@FlywithMagnar
Жыл бұрын
A very good advise, indeed.
@dextergellizeau9330
Жыл бұрын
The pilot flying also put a lot of faith in the instructor pilot.
@branko7805
Жыл бұрын
Thank you Captain Magnar,as an engineer working on this type I am deeply stressed seeing ATR crashed. Unbelievable mistake.
@manofcultura
Жыл бұрын
Perhaps making the feathering level into a wheel like a trim wheel will help with muscle memory? In low speed and low altitude trying to stay conscious of levers seem like it could go wrong somehow. Having a totally different feel and mechanism might help unconsciously differentiate controls.
@pfsantos007
Жыл бұрын
@@manofcultura I think the levers are quite different enough. Humans do some crazy things under pressure. I though maybe adding an audible warning as in "Levers - Feather" would help, but there's no guarantee of that helping since hearing is one of the first things to go and numerous accident reports have noted pilots not hearing audible alarms when in a very stressful live or die situation.
@guitarhillbilly1482
Жыл бұрын
@@pfsantos007 I agree with you. Some folks go completely "brainless" in high stress situations.
@SERBZILLA1
Жыл бұрын
@@guitarhillbilly1482 This was not a stressful situation. Excellent weather conditions, light wind, good weather, excellent visibility.
@gerardbowden9298
Жыл бұрын
Thankyou Captain for a sincere discussion of this accident. As someone who has flown ATRs for nearly 26yrs, I too find it unbelievable that the CLs may have been moved to the FX position.
@charles727727
Жыл бұрын
Thank you for a greatly detailed video Captain Magnar. It is frightening to see this experienced Captain not realize such an enormous pilot error. The CVR will certainly reveal some important details about this tragic accident. Charles here, Airline Pilot in Los Angeles California.
@FlyingPlaneAndSimple
Жыл бұрын
Excellent walkthrough of that report, and your accompanying video and visuals. A real tragedy for certain. Thanks for the time you took to put this together.
@guitarhillbilly1482
Жыл бұрын
For the folks on this thread saying the crew had such a short time to correct the "mistake" just sit down in a chair and Count fast: 1000 and one 1000 and two 1000 and three And do that to 52. [Cut it in half to 26 seconds and there still was time to make corrections and get the propellers producing thrust again] The number of seconds they had to look at the Engine and Propeller settings on the Quadrant and the TORQUE METERS. Something really smells about this whole report and story. The crew had plenty of time to correct their mistake before the Stick Shaker and stall / crash.
@juanamengual3798
Жыл бұрын
Very easy Capt: 1- PF……”Flaps 30” 2- PM….checks speed and announce “Flaps 30 selected” 3- PM…when Flaps REACHED desired setting announces “FLAPS 30 SET” END OF DISCUSSION. I flew ATRs for 17 years (9200hrs) and find this a CLEAR example of lack of discipline. Just 3 easy steps. But hey…there are many “astronauts” around….
@-DC-
Жыл бұрын
Exactly This ⬆️
@call_me_stan5887
Жыл бұрын
Very interesting, educational video. That's just too bad this accident happened due to such a basic mistake. May I also point out that the quality of your videos went up when it comes to graphics and overall presentation, which is a great addition to your outstanding narration backed up by lots of flight hours and overall experience. Thank you!
@NicolaW72
Жыл бұрын
Thank you very much for this review! In fact more than one mistake was made in the very short time of only 60 seconds: - the "basic" mistake of confusing flaps lever with condition lever - the mistake not clearing it during Before-Landing-Check-List - the mistake of Flaps 30 afterwards without a Callout (at least I readed the Preliminary Report in this way) - the mistake not getting aware then that the Condition Levers were in the Feathered-Position - the mistake not getting aware that the Condition Levers were in the Feathered-Position when the Power Levers were moved - maybe also switching roles of PF and PM eventually in a very dangerous situation. And not to forget: It was an unstabilized Approach! Indeed incredible. My impression from reading the Preliminary Report was, too, that the PM acted behind the back of the PF - what is the most disturbing part in this whole Crash Sequence. That was definetely more than only bad CRM. The ongoing investigation will definetely have to take a closer look onto Human Factors, indeed.
@Johnlee0513
Жыл бұрын
I am not a pilot but in the work I do there is a saying "familiarity breeds contempt" and perhaps this played a part. God Bless the poor souls who perished
@NicolaW72
Жыл бұрын
@@Johnlee0513 Both Pilots were of course familiar with the ATR 72 - the Pilot Instructor even very familiar. But the Approach they flew was new, therefore two Captains were seated on the Flight Deck, and the Pilot Flying did this particular Approach probably for the first time. As Magnar stated in the video: Both Pilots were probably looking out of the window for exact this reason and this contributed to the Crash. The Sequence of this Event is nevertheless disturbing if you take a closer look. I hope the Final Report will answer the open Questions - and there´re still a couple of important ones. It seems to be a really important investigation, not only one for this special case.
@NicolaW72
Жыл бұрын
@timemachine194 Of course we don´t know if the Preliminary Report really contains everything what the FDR and the CVR are containing, as Magnar stated in the Video. But let´s take it for a moment as if everything is published what they´re containing. The FDR than shows that between the switches of roles between the Pilot Flying and the Pilot Monitoring (10:57:18) and the Impact (10:57:33) there happened not a pull back of the Yoke instead of a move forward as it was the case in the Colgan Air - there was simply no Control Input at all - NOTHING! Even nothing when the Stick Shaker was going (at 10:57:24). THAT has to be explained. The Aircraft was performing a difficult and for the Pilots NEW CIRCLE APPROACH. The Aircraft just turned from Base to Final and the Pilots tried to line it up with the Runway. Following the River was in this situation no option for them. Then: This Aircraft stalled because the Propellers were - obviously unrecognized - in the Feathered Position - NOT because the Pilot Flying pulled the Yoke back instead of moving him forward, to repeat this! Short before the Role Switch of PF and PM the Power Levers were even set to Full Thrust - what would have been the absolutely right action in this situation - but what was useless with the Condition Levers in the Feathered Position. Magnar explains this in great details. Please watch his video again. This is a very different Story compared to the Colgan Air Crash.
@NicolaW72
Жыл бұрын
@timemachine194 Thank you very much for your Work which you made yourself with this Post. Not Loss of Engines - the Engines were in the Feathered Position. They were flying low and slow in the last turn from base to final when the stall happened. The Autopilot was off. Flaps 30 were only done at 10:56:56, not when the PF (left seat) called for it twenty seconds earlier. Did you anything read about Control Inputs between 10:57:18 and 10:57:32 in the quoted part of the text? Of course we must wait in this context for the Final Report as mentioned because we don´t know so far if the Preliminary Report really contains every available information about the Crash Sequence. But if we take for a moment as a complete description of that Crash Sequence what the Preliminary Report contains - because why should the investigators hide necessery informations for the understanding what happened? - then there was no control input from the IP at all when he became again PF, so no Nose Down, too - and that was of course another very serious mistake, adding up to all his other mistakes he made before. The Pitching up happened between 10:57:17 and 10:57.24, what matches perfectly to the Ground Observer Video and what happens when you´re turning with the Propellers in Feathered Position. With no control inputs => no nose down, gliding was impossible. When the Stick Shaker was going at 10:57:24, there were 2 seconds left - two! - before the Aircraft stalled. So at this Point the Game was probably anyway over: Too much too serious failure´s. Openly said: I got the impression when reading the Preliminary Report that they could have glided two more hours, they wouldn´t had detected that the Condition Levers were in the Feathered Position. How much more best occasions did they needed to recognize this? Maybe the Final Report will contain some more bad Surprises. He will surely deal much with Human Factors and will probably be from broader importance for Air Safety.
@NicolaW72
Жыл бұрын
@timemachine194 That´s indeed possible, yes.
@todortodorov940
Жыл бұрын
1. Aviate, 2. Navigate, 3. Communicate 1. Check air-speed, power levers, flap position, attitude, etc. 2. Look out of the window to see where the airport is. 3. Talk to ATC. It appears that they skipped parts of nr.1 to concentrate on 2. They got the priorities wrong. Why this happened is a different story. I guess flying for decades give you too much confidence and you ignore and forget trivial tasks, especially in the first category. I am not a pilot, but when I took my car drivers license, I was very careful looking to the side, behind me etc. before turning. I will be lying if I say that I am that thorough today (25 years later); I am more confident when turning, but I do not always double check every angle as I used to.
@jcheck6
Жыл бұрын
Tudor, for not being a pilot well said!
@C-130-Hercules
Жыл бұрын
One word can bring you down... Complacency 😮
@ijazmohammedmm584
Жыл бұрын
Both are captains and they are overconfident I guess
@anandabherath1009
Жыл бұрын
Very well said. Makes a lot of sense. Helps one understand how an experience pilot could make such a basic error. I was wondering how that could have happened.
@andrewcullum8437
Жыл бұрын
So...props feathered...and therefore no thrust...therefore.. speed decayed....stall and spin..
@brianpeele311
Жыл бұрын
Nice report. As a crew trainer, 50 years of experience, the most overlooked, or perhaps overcooked, investigation response is the human brain and how it perceives “routine”. In this case you have a trainee pilot and a trainer. The trainer was PM, BUT, he is a trainer and always is thinking as a PF. So now you have 2 PFs and no PM. There is a reason for the PF/PM relationship. Every single CFIT is caused by the PM, why? Clearly he was not monitoring. No pilot flies into the ground intentionally. But when both pilots are looking at the same thing, they see the same thing and even when there is confusion (like this case when PF said more than once that there was no power), the workload was too high at that point to figure it out. The brain jut doesn’t see. This accident di not happen that day, it developed over the years by individuals who develop routines as PF. There is NO specific training for PFs. Every CFIT has been caused by experienced aircrew. It is obvious to me as to the cause of this accident. I have been able to make crews in the simulator to get into these positions. The solution is recognizing the way the brain operates. I recommend anything from Edward de Bono as reference
@NicolaW72
9 ай бұрын
A very interesting Hypothesis. The Final Report is out now.
@pascalb2062
Жыл бұрын
Danke! I am getting into the ATR with msfs and your videos are amazing!
@FlywithMagnar
Жыл бұрын
Vielen Dank!
@jerryweirdspeed8943
Жыл бұрын
It hurts to think that the instructor was so oblivious to the scene that they did not notice the props feathered on 1. moving the lever 2. doing the checklist 3. setting flaps 4. receiving power loss comments from the PF. Receiving controls when the situation had already gotten so out of hand did not improve chances of recovery as the one closest to discovering the mistake was now in a recovery maneuver. Let's hope we will find out more to take some meaningful conclusions away from this tragedy. May the souls of those on board find peace.
@NicolaW72
Жыл бұрын
It´s indeed obvious that more than one mistake was made during this short time of only 60 seconds.
@SurajUpadhyaya-kj8zi
Жыл бұрын
Hi...Do you think it is normal thing to do to change the flight duties in the final moment when PF became the PM and PM became the PF ? Shouldn't the PF continue flying until Landing or Go Around Procedure is complete?
@jerryweirdspeed8943
Жыл бұрын
@@SurajUpadhyaya-kj8zi I believe they switched control to the more experienced pilot when it had already become obvious that there was some kind of problem. Remember the left seat was on a familiarization flight.
@NicolaW72
Жыл бұрын
@@jerryweirdspeed8943 Indeed. But nevertheless it´s at least a point to discuss if this was a sensefull decision - both pilots had to find themselves in that new roles for what no time remained - and so far as I read the Preliminary Report no Control Inputs were made during the final 14 seconds of the flight.
@jerryweirdspeed8943
Жыл бұрын
@@NicolaW72 instructor did not check prop lever upon finally setting flaps. easy mistake to make even if it sounds unusual to have 4 occasions to miss the fact that the props are feathered and still not check the levers consciously. neither pilot did that in the end, it appears. and this is the tragedy of this incident. they did not perform checklists correctly nor did they show presence of mind when troubleshooting the issue. nor did they have much time at all whilst executing an approach to a new airport. and i'm not judging whether it was sufficient time. this is not up to me.
@sklajban
Жыл бұрын
Many thanks for creating this educational content, captain!
@FlywithMagnar
Жыл бұрын
Thank you so much! Highly appreciated!
@saoraovjoshi
Жыл бұрын
@@FlywithMagnar Yes pilot decreased condition lever instead of flaws to 30° Engine turned off fuel supply due to that plane crashed - Cockpit Recorder
@guitarhillbilly1482
Жыл бұрын
The crew had several different methods to recognize the Props had been Feathered. What about the Torque Meter Indication? What about the Sound of the Engines/ Propellers? What about the Airspeed? The Flap handle does not need to be moved anywhere. It is shaped completely different that the other controls and located by itself on the far right side of the Pedestal/ Quadrant . The Shape and Location separates it from every other control and there is NO EXCUSE for grabbing the Condition Levers instead of the Flap handle.
@johnc7144
Жыл бұрын
I live in SE Asia and my opinion is that many men in his region have a attitude problem. A pilot in this region probably came from a wealthy family and as a man has been catered to all his life. Probably never flew small single engine planes and never developed a feel for flight. Limited patience and mechanical aptitude and not inclined to be aware of detail. I expect we will see much more of this type of unbelievable error in the future. Pilot demand in Asia is growing and selection will become less demanding. I have flown this exact route.
@GhaziRawashdeh-ru7qn
Жыл бұрын
Dear Captain, Your video is a master's piece and most valuable in commenting on the accident, I share with you the noble feelings towards the lost lifes and their beloved ones, with hope to get a final report that will thoroughly analyze human factors that contributed to the fatal accident. Sure such final report will improve future ATR operations safety. My observations on the accident on the Aviation Herald URL are below and would like to add them to comments on your video: "Observations on Yeti AT72 at Pokhara By Ghazi on Saturday, Feb 18th 2023 18:09Z PM not moving flaps and acknowledging the PF’s call is weird, especially with both propellers speed decreasing simultaneously and Tq going to 0% without commenting, as per CVR findings. Cond Levers are Dual with releasable toggles while flaps lever is Single Aerofoil shape left to move type. PF not realizing change of attitude expected when extending landing flaps is also strange. Master caution chime went neglected, instead a normal “Before Landing Checklist” was called for and carried out, no reference to Master Caution; again weird. Discussing whether to continue turning and descending draws the question “had they considered landing straight ahead instead of going towards the runway?) this is vague. Seems that moving flaps to 30 degrees by the PM was prompted by reaching 500 feet AGL 22 seconds past the PF call needs thorough analyses. Too late a call by the PF about lack of power and disparate attempts to increase power from disabled propellers, followed by control handover to the PM".
@douglasloreto
Жыл бұрын
Instead of the sad situation, is a very good content which enriches aeronautical safety culture. Tks Capt Magnar
@swerne01
Жыл бұрын
The initial mistake of pulling the throttles back instead of the flaps control is bad enough. However as you said, work overload can cause strange things to happen. In Minnesota about a year ago during a traffic stop a police officer decided to use a Taser to subdue an uncooperative driver. She was also acting as an instructor for a new officer. However, although she announced "Taser" as per protocol she pulled out her pistol and killed the car's driver. This was despite the fact that the Taser was on the opposite side of her belt (she had to use her opposite hand to draw it) and was shaped differently than the pistol. So it can happen that situational overload can cause such a mistake even in an experienced police officer. I understand that both these pilots had lots of experience with this aircraft, although the airport was new to them. And as you said, the mistake was still recoverable and the plane could still have been landed safely at this point. However, the time it took these pilots to discover what the problem was apparently exceeded the time the plane could fly with no power and flaps in the wrong position. Here is where their training needs to be looked at. I hope the voice recording gives you the necessary information to avoid this happening again.
@eXHackeR
Жыл бұрын
New video on police activity shows a shooting in Albuquerque grocery store and a one of the cops runs in on body cam wifj their taser out. Then realized after trying to pull the trigger and switched the pistol and starting shooting at suspect.
@pilotpolle3177
Жыл бұрын
I cannot stop thinking if the fact that the PM was a captain sitting in the right seat plays a role. Some captains have a habit of reaching the the flaps from beneath with two fingers, lift up with just two fingers and pull back (not to interfere with the first officer operation of the power levers). If the captain did this from the right seat as well, you can actually operate both flaps and condition levers without feeling the shape of the lever, which could explain why the mistake was not immediately corrected.
@shivapoudel9059
Жыл бұрын
Can you explain further..with example
@NicolaW72
Жыл бұрын
Thank you for this information! - Yes, this is plausible.
@AviAeroAsis
Жыл бұрын
Point.
@Sciolist
Жыл бұрын
Good catch
@oshosanyamichael9589
Жыл бұрын
Why is it not possible to take a quick glance at the lever before you pull it?
@capta1nc
Жыл бұрын
It's absolutely possible - I pulled the mixture once in a PA28 instead of turning carb heat on in the landing pattern - two levers in different places, with different shapes. I was a student distracted by radio calls, and it took a good while to realise why the engine had "gone quiet".
@leobakkerflightandspace6655
Жыл бұрын
Same here. Even in a case such as this, where it seems glaringly obvious that the pilot made a “stupid” mistake, I hesitate to use that word, since it is so human to be momentarily distracted and then do something completely different from what you intended to do.
@RasheedKhan-he6xx
9 ай бұрын
Very valid point.
@simonscharf-pv1od
Жыл бұрын
Captain Magnar, thank you for your thoughtful, calm and professional presentation of the interim report and the circumstances involved with this aircraft loss. I look forward to seeing your future work when the final report is delivered. You’re a wonderfully insightful person and a credit to your profession. Thanks again.
@noneNone-mw1px
Жыл бұрын
Both pilots did not bothered themselves to look at the pedestal even for a second and check the flaps, condition and power levers. That is the most logical things. Even when I fly my Cessna 172 I keep monitoring all thing up to shut down the engine.
@friendlyreptile9931
Жыл бұрын
A comercial pilot flyies not just once a day or every vew days. If you fly like 5 different routes a day, you are in greater danger to become victim to a routine and so you maybe miss something. Most people are very carefull with everything that they don't do on a daily base b.c. they know that they can make misstakes and wan't to prevent them but if you do things regularly, you start to miss things b.c. the tension will become less each time.
@noneNone-mw1px
Жыл бұрын
@@friendlyreptile9931 in this case that is bad really specially when they know the life of many souls is in their hands.
@friendlyreptile9931
Жыл бұрын
@@noneNone-mw1px Yeah that's true.
@stephensmith4480
Жыл бұрын
@@friendlyreptile9931 That`s so true my friend. As the old saying goes, familiarity breeds contempt.
@Jamboliner
Жыл бұрын
I call that good airmanship from your part. That is why piloting isn't for everyone. Equipments are getting better and better. Systems are put in place to assist pilots throught all stages of flight. Pilots need to be adamant towards check list and OPF. The ATR 72 is an awesome piece of equipment, which has achieved it's purpose 100%.
@mdani76
Жыл бұрын
Hello Captain; I've been An ATR pilot for 8 years in Italy and that preliminary report sounded really unbelievable... but as you say, this will surely be a "master case" in Human Factor, regarding workload and fixation and... a lot of other classic errors done in aviation crashes history. I'm really really sad after watching your video... by the way... it's a really good video, keep going, I will follow your channel! Best regards, Mauro
@NicolaW72
Жыл бұрын
After a couple of month: Yes, indeed, exactly. And the "missing links" between what we know so far could contain some more bad surprises in this direction. It was really a very sad event.
@gshenaut
Жыл бұрын
I'm not a pilot, but I wonder, given the degree of technology there is in modern avionics, why there isn't more verbal auditory feedback when controls are used. For example, “Both props feathered” or “Flaps 30”.
@jadesluv
Жыл бұрын
And read the altitude and squat switch for an immediate terse audio warning, ATR needs to alert pilots that make these deadly mistakes.
@camilosarmiento4929
Жыл бұрын
Perhaps not to the stage of flap warning, but yes it would not be easy to program in the backend with a rule. If aircraft is airborne and prop goes to feather, then audible warning in the likes of “feather” should be triggered. Same as in a simple piston like the baron, if flaps are down and throttle is reduced below a certain point it will alert for gear if not down.
@IMG343
Жыл бұрын
It's really not necessary. Would compicate an already busy environment during a critical stage of flight
@cccmmm1234
Жыл бұрын
It doesn't help. People ignore it. Listen to the Air France 447 crash. The stall warning was shouting "stall, stall" over 50 times and all three pilots ignored the fact it was stalling.
@prashkd7684
Жыл бұрын
Engineers need to be aware of a thing called " nuisance information " which could be distracting to "trained" pilots.
@flavioveiga
Жыл бұрын
Congratulations Capt Magnar. Very professional, following the official report and giving many examples with images. Good job.
@ramu1kto
Жыл бұрын
Thank You ! Watching from Nepal !
@stephenmajor5498
Жыл бұрын
Very well said. As a fellow pilot, I can appreciate your objectiveness in having as much information as practical before offering any conclusions as to the final cause of the accident. It's quite easy to reach an answer based on the obvious outcome paired with the physical evidence collected. But as you mentioned, there's a percentage yet to be assigned from the standpoint of human factors. And that may be more than anyone can imagine. Bless those that lost their lives.
@1000kennedydk
Жыл бұрын
The role changing that occurred on the flight deck, I believe, contributed to the problem. The check airman moving to the right side still has muscle memory from the left seat. Muscle memory can help us or kill us.
@DearMe247
Жыл бұрын
Muscle memory from the seat ?
@PRH123
8 ай бұрын
@@DearMe247 things you were doing with your right hand, you now do with your left
@VC27
Жыл бұрын
Lucid explanation. As a layman, I could comprehend everything. Thank you Captain.
@m.f.m.67
Жыл бұрын
Many years ago, after we had landing and were clearing the runway, I called for the after landing checklist. The first thing the FO did was reach over and retract the gear lever!! Thank goodness the "squat" switches did their job and prevented retraction. I almost broke his knuckles when I reached across and slammed the gear lever back down so hard. Almost gave me a heart attack...Some people just don't look!
@Johnlee0513
Жыл бұрын
relative to your post he stated that the job of the "right seat" was to keep eyes on the controls and indicators for anything not normal....it was apparent you "saved the day" not the case here
@roberto2468
Жыл бұрын
Thank You so much (from Argentina) for share this vid. Very clear and educative for those who love aviation. 🙏
@walterthorne4819
Жыл бұрын
Captain your trainings and analysis videos are very excellent… Many experienced pilots at times find themselves behind the airplane for many different reasons. In this accident likely several factors contributed. I alway like the landing gear switch up and away from the power console..also I prefer the flap switch to be away from the power console. It’s easy to instantly grab the wrong lever thus a determined visual validation is critical. The flap switch up and away makes sense to me.
@laurasalo6160
9 ай бұрын
Yep. Anyone who drives a stick knows that one can put it into 4th gear instead of 2nd very easily because theyre side by side. I liken it to this. One has to be alert to the feel, the sound, or the instrument panel indication, to catch the error cuz it isnt obvious at first glance of the shifter.
@Johnny-oz8pg
9 ай бұрын
As a Pilot, I really appreciate your inform and deep knowledge about our plane, the excellent French ATR Series… God bless you!!!
@anandabherath1009
Жыл бұрын
Very clear explanation. It is sad that 72 people lost their lives probably due to an unimaginable error by the pilots. The high workload due to changing the approach direction to the runway probably led to such an error, if I understand right. The family and the relatives of all those who perished deserve to know what happened, and knowing the truth will help avoid such accidents in the future, I believe. May all those who passed away rest in peace.
@etbaj1
Жыл бұрын
Thank you for your hard work in researching and making this video. An excellent tool to illustrate the many human factors that led to the crash. It will be good to analyse the full report in due course.
@paulhindle3961
Жыл бұрын
Sometimes we call this type of mistake "finger trouble". although this is an extreme example. We train crews to select then verify flap and other configuration changes which this crew didn't do. We also enforce the stabilized approach policy - if unstable, for any reason, we go around. It's never just one reason that an accident occurs.
@NicolaW72
Жыл бұрын
Indeed. And here a couple of serious mistakes were made in the short time of only 60 seconds.
@acasualviewer5861
Жыл бұрын
I can totally see myself making a mistake like this. Sometimes the mind just does weird things, especially when you're new (like on of the pilots was). Your mind gets blurred with too much stuff and you move the wrong lever. But that's the point of having 2 pilots. The other person should say: "What are you doing?" And the mistake is corrected. Trust but verify.
@LordOfSweden
Жыл бұрын
They should not put levers that are that important to be that similar and together. It's insane that you can even make that mistake
@IRELAND_MY_LOVE
Жыл бұрын
I much prefer this style rather than the gimme gimme sponsored ones. Much more natural and told in a story-like matter. Well done.
@ChrisL1971
Жыл бұрын
It's no longer needed to optimize RPM vs prop position because it's automated during flight. So the condition lever should move to a other position in the cockpit because it's only used at start/stop and emergency.
@olasek7972
Жыл бұрын
I don’t think it will happen, it is a perfect position, human stupidity will defeat any system
@znogteyam
Жыл бұрын
Wonderfully explained, Captain Magnar. Definitely workload management and situational awareness. Then STARTLE EFFECT kicked in when they realized they lost power. They needed at least 20 seconds to recover from the startle effect.
@arieltellis458
Жыл бұрын
Excellent explanation that even a lay person can understand with ease. Thank you.
@blatherskite9601
Жыл бұрын
Takk for at du la ut videoen, Magnar. Har ikke hørt om en dritt etter kræsj. Veldig imponert ove din evalueringen.
@FlywithMagnar
Жыл бұрын
Vanligvis tar det et halvt år før den første rapporten publiseres. Så dette er faktisk ganske så unikt at rapporten kommer så tidlig. Desverre mangler mange detaljer.
@jonnyjetstreamer997
Жыл бұрын
I flew ATR’s for years. For something like this to happen is just unbelievable
@_-HaKooNa.MaTaTa-
Жыл бұрын
is it possible that the investigation report was scripted to favour the airline and other stake holders. I mean its always a custom to blame the dead pilots rather taking any responsibility.
@jonnyjetstreamer997
Жыл бұрын
@@_-HaKooNa.MaTaTa- Absolutely not
@andyc9902
Жыл бұрын
Sabotage?
@trendyromish4789
Жыл бұрын
@@_-HaKooNa.MaTaTa- This Is The Report Of Nepal Investigator, there Is Still French Investigators are Ingestigating.
@captarmour
Жыл бұрын
Thank you for this heartfelt analysis of this accident. One thing I can say is due to the AUTO function of the Condition Levers, advancing the CLs(PROPS) to MAX is not in Muscle Memory! This makes it easier to not check the position of the CLs on Final Approach than in Aircraft without this function.
@rjobrien7805
Жыл бұрын
RIP to all those that perished in this crash. It can't be ruled out that the pilot monitoring deliberately moved both condition levers to feather for some reason. We can speculate on that reason but it's a bit suspicious that the CVR text hasn't yet been released.
@m.f.m.67
Жыл бұрын
I agree. Bringing both propellers into feather is so bizarre as to be suspicious of being an intentional act. But then later, the flaps were set to 30, so I suspect the pilot monitoring quietly tried to correct (or hide) his mistake?
@earthb67
Жыл бұрын
@@m.f.m.67 Then why not restore the condition levers back to auto at that point also?
@2760ade
Жыл бұрын
@@earthb67 That's the biggest question in my opinion. He must have realised he hadn't set the flaps to 30, but he must have ALSO realised that he had earlier accidentally moved something else? Makes no sense to me!
@NicolaW72
Жыл бұрын
@@2760ade It´s indeed so that after the "basic" mistake of confusing Flaps Lever with Condition Lever five or six more crucial mistakes were made in just 42 seconds: 1.) The "basic" mistake was not cleared when the Pilots worked the Before-Landing-Checklist. 2.) When the Flaps were finally set to 30 there was no Call-Out made by the Pilot Monitoring (at least I readed the Preliminary Report in this way), so that the Pilot Flying stayed unaware of this action at that time. 3.) When the Flaps were eventually setted to 30 the mistake that the Condition Levers were in the Feathered Position stayed undetected - or at least uncorrected. 4.) When the Power Levers were moved first to 62% and then to Full Power the mistake of the Condition Levers being in the Feathered-Position was also not detected or at least not corrected by BOTH Pilots . 5.) The Pilots switched the Roles of Pilot Flying and Pilot Monitoring in that now very dangerous situation, so that they wasted time with accomodating to their new Roles instead of FLYING THE AIRCRAFT. 6.) That all happened during an unstabilized approach (= Checklists were not completed and Landing Configuration was not finished above 500 feet AGL), so that the Pilots were during this whole Accident Sequence always behind their Aircraft. And then finally - again: at least I readed the Preliminary Report in this way - the former Pilot Monitoring and now Pilot Flying made no Control Inputs during the final 14 seconds of the Flight, even not when eventually the Stick Shaker was going. That means, he was NOT flying the Aircraft when he became Pilot Flying. To type all of this mistakes in lasted nearly half an hour - the real Crash Sequence lasted only 60 seconds all-in-all. That is to remember. But nevertheless: There was seldom a Crash were in such a short time such an amount of really crucial and weird mistakes were made. So there remains really the need for the ongoing investigation to find an answer to the question: Why?
@keepinitrea
Жыл бұрын
I've been saying that ever since the report came out, there's no way he mistakenly moved the lever instead of the flaps!!!!! It seems he was an experienced pilot.
@madelinescafe8573
Жыл бұрын
Thank you! That was a very good analysis! Keep them coming!
@bikeny
Жыл бұрын
I like your presentation. One big thing in your favor is the complete lack of music playing over your narration. I wish other YT hosts would stop with the music. That being said, thank you for this report. I look forward to seeing your report when the final report comes out. You've gotten a sub from me.
@CirrusGraham
Жыл бұрын
Excellent overview of the initial report. I am reading through material for my ATPL exams at the moment, and your explanation of the set up of the turbo prop engine was a lovely addition, as I felt I had enough time to identify the parts of the engine layout before you clearly explained each piece. This was a very unfortunate accident, and it will be interesting to hear what was said in the cockpit during this sequence of events, once the final report in released. Thank you for putting this video together.
@guitarhillbilly1482
Жыл бұрын
Mr. Magnar does a great job explaining the ATR Quadrant and the Preliminary Accident Report.
@ekaftan
Жыл бұрын
This must have been a very difficult video for you to make. Thanks.
@fep_ptcp883
9 ай бұрын
Why don't you check the flight TAM 3054, crashed in São Paulo, Brazil in 2007, to see another terrible lever mistake just before landing?
@Slarti
Жыл бұрын
When I was learning to fly and seeing all the switches in the cockpit I asked the instructor "should I look at the switch before actioning it in case I flip the wrong switch?" to which the instructor replied "you could do that". I am amazed that it's not standard procedure to look, reach and action rather than just reach and action when manipulating controls in an aircraft. Of course this sort of thing happens - you need to look at what you are doing. When at the end you say that you find it unbelievable that this could happen I think that is part of the problem - the problem is a human factor issue and as assumption that people do not make stupid mistakes - there should be some sort of warning if the props are feathered and if the engine speed is increased while the props are feathered there should be a further warning. The point is people make mistakes, I don't care if someone is a highly trained pilot - they will still make dumb mistakes once in a while and in this case it led to loss of life.
@NicolaW72
Жыл бұрын
Indeed, exactly.
@Demoralized88
10 ай бұрын
I've never seen a first-world Airline that didn't explicitly train ACTUALLY verifying and confirming that all checklist items are performed correctly and the criticality of not becoming complacent. Especially so after all the high profile takeoff crashes of the 70s-90s that were the result of NOT performing critical checklists correctly. The takeoff/landing checklists in particular have the PM repeat command, visually confirm change, with the PF also verifying it afterwards. This is a huge part of training and has been a point of emphasis for decades now, and every cockpit video I've ever seen has the PM and PF both verifying checklist items
@angelsandoval6493
Жыл бұрын
Nice to meet you Captain Magnar. Excellent analysis accident Yeti 691. I think ATR should review the checklist in BEFORE LANDING and add CL....AUTO POSITION.
@Trevor_Austin
Жыл бұрын
Apart from looking at the performance of the crew I believe another thing that should be considered is making the selection of “feather” on the condition levers a two handed operation. That can be either a warning inhibit or a mechanical interlock.
@2760ade
Жыл бұрын
I'm surprised there isn't an indicator and a warning alarm when the props are feathered! Would make sense surely!
@robmausser
Жыл бұрын
I'm wondering why the plane should even allow you to feather props mid-flight when there is power to the engines. I understand the desire to feather a prop if there is a stalled or dead engine, but the plane shouldn't even allow you to feather engines in flight that are receiving power from the turbine. Maybe i'm missing a situation where you would want this?
@Trevor_Austin
Жыл бұрын
@@2760adeAn alarm sounds reasonable until you have a real engine failure. The you want the propeller to be feathered. The indication that this has been achieved is Np is zero. It must be therefore possible to cancel such an alarm however the propellor will still have been feathered.
@Trevor_Austin
Жыл бұрын
@@robmausserOne such situation might be when you have a jammed engine control, a EEC/PEC failure resulting in a runaway engine/propellor, loss of oil pressure or an engine fire.
@naturallyherb
Жыл бұрын
Thank you for such a thorough and detailed explanation that is easy to understand. Also really appreciate the cutaway diagrams of the aircraft engine you made here.
@apuwdm2
Жыл бұрын
Great explanation from Magnar. My queries: A feathered prop produces no drag to the slipstream only when the engine is not running (due to engine failure etc.). However when the engine is running and the propeller gets feathered (as in case of the Yeti aircraft), shouldn't the engine get seriously loaded as the propeller blades are trying to churn a large volume of air at the very worst angle? To give you a car passenger holding a sheet of cardboard analogy: As the car is running, the passenger holds the thin edge of the cardboard into the slipstream - that is feathering, hence least drag. However, if the car passenger holds the cardboard at right angle to the slipstream, this produces hence maximum drag. In my opinion, that is how the props in the Yeti aircraft were set on the final approach of this flight. Should there not be an interlock that prevents feathering of props on a running engine? Or are there conditions in the flight that require the pilots to feather the props on a running engine? Thanks for your reply in advance.
@FlywithMagnar
Жыл бұрын
When a propeller is feathered, the fuel flow to the engine is automatically reduced to idle power within a couple of seconds. To shut down the engine, the propeller must be feathered first. This must be done when there's an engine fire, loss of oil pressure, to name two examples.
@apuwdm2
Жыл бұрын
@@FlywithMagnar , thanks for your reply. So if when the prop is feathered and the fuel flow goes automatically idle setting, I assume that produced power is not adequate to turn the free turbine for driving the propeller gearbox i.e. the engine cannot be overloaded by the prop blades in the absolutely worst angle to absorb power from the running engine? The pilots must have definitely heard the engines go to idle speed but were seriously distracted by the terrain or overwhelmed by the sudden loss of thrust to ignore the obvious mistakes. I think this calls for additional training and addition of more conditions in the checks - recognition of inadvertent feathering of props and how to recover from the situation, at low altitude.
@FlywithMagnar
Жыл бұрын
@@apuwdm2, at idle power on ground, the propeller rotates with approximately 14% NP. I assume it will be similar in flight. "Assume" because I have never flown with an engine running with a feathered propeller.
@NativeNepal
Жыл бұрын
I felt so pity to departed soul and relatives to hear this very clear and important information , respect from Nepal 🙏
@SolveigDeux
Жыл бұрын
Thank you for this very detailed input.
@MikeCaffyn1
Жыл бұрын
Hello. This is first time I have watched one of your videos. I REALLY like your no nonsense style, engineering accuracy and quality of graphics. Regarding this tragic, inexplicable accident, the elephant in the room is a deliberate act. I guess we may never know.
@faganfit572
Жыл бұрын
I honestly believe that there was a breakdown in SOP’s, whether that be through the airline itself, or the individuals. Like you said however, let us wait for the final report.
@Trevor_Austin
Жыл бұрын
If you are correct then this is the start of the investigation, not the end. Mashing up or totally ignoring SOP’s should not result in the aircraft being placed in a dangerous configuration.
@faganfit572
Жыл бұрын
@@Trevor_Austin Hey Trevor. I would have to respectfully disagree. There are many fatal accidents that have been caused as a result of the crew not following SOP’s. By drifting away from standard procedures, what you’re doing is exposing yourself to potentially dangerous errors that could adversely affect overall safety. Check out Mentor Pilot’s channel. He has several examples.
@SurajUpadhyaya-kj8zi
Жыл бұрын
@@faganfit572 Hi...but I think we all are taught about the swiss cheese model....Fatal accidents happen due to series of mistakes. Just one mistake should not cause the crash to happen?
@faganfit572
Жыл бұрын
@@SurajUpadhyaya-kj8zi Very true Suraj. We can just aim to do our best as aviators.
@fidelcatsro6948
Жыл бұрын
could be watching tiktok instead of concentrating on the flight
@christophers.8553
Жыл бұрын
Simple and straight up review of the report. Thank you.
@craig7350
Жыл бұрын
Isn't it ridiculous that in this day when local coffee shops have multiple cameras, that in these crucial investigations we're relegated to hunkering over a tape recorder guessing what certain 'clicks' may have been.
@ronenfe
Жыл бұрын
It's pathetic
@Covid-me1xf
Жыл бұрын
pilots dont want to be filmed when they consume cocaine or play with the stewardess.
@PRH123
8 ай бұрын
The data recorders can be upgraded to record what levers were pulled and buttons pushed without recording video. Pilots are resistant to video recording for various reasons. One thing I've heard mentioned is that in worst cases, they don't want the video of their final moments to be circulated in the internet. They also don't want hourly micromanaging and micropunishing of their performance.
@dinoalien6090
Жыл бұрын
Dear Captain, many thanks for publication, worth to be seen by everyone flying. We’ve played this scenario at training cab 3 days ago.. 🤦🏻♂️😢
@andreapelizzari6455
Жыл бұрын
Good quality analysis, respectful to the pilots and all people involved. Question: why isn’t there a computer voice feedback whenever there’s a change of configuration? In this case the voice message would have been “condition lever feathered” instead of “flap 30”. Would it help avoiding mistakes? or maybe would it be an annoyance for the pilots?
@FlywithMagnar
Жыл бұрын
Thank you for your contribution! If there are too many computerized feedbacks, there's a risk that the pilots might get so used to them that they stop listening to them. And yes, they might be annoying because a lot is happening during takeoff and landing. The solution might be Jarvis (Ironman AI).
@joergwiesmann4261
Жыл бұрын
Thank You very much dear Capt. Magnar !! for this very detailed explained Video !!! I' m very sad for the Passenger and the Crew .. and the Peoples they lost the loved !!! God blesse them !! in the Video I felt the stress the crew had .... no Power increase and Speed dropping !! Thank YOU for the insight dear Sir !!! Kinde regards and safe Flights ftom Switzerland !! ex CDR SAAB 2000
@shug831
Жыл бұрын
I find it amazing that there is no safety lock preventing selecting the feathered position on both engines at the same time while flying. I know they feather both engines after coming to a stop but to be able to operate the leavers together while flying should require a extra interlock to be overcome to prevent a no thrust situation.
@GeeBeeMike
Жыл бұрын
You absolutely have to have full control over the Props at all times. In the unlikely event you suffer a double engine failure, then you would NEED to feather both props if the auto-feathering failed to operate, otherwise you will lose control of the aircraft. I hear what you’re saying, but it’s just not feasible. I’ve got thousands of hours flying ATR’s such as this, all be it many years ago now. Had an engine failure of my own on take off in one as well with an associated fire. Since flown most of the heavy jets and still do, but the ATR was a real handful at times, especially in strong cross wind. This is a tragic accident, but it isn’t the first time in aviation history where mistakingly moving the wrong lever has caused a catastrophic accident, and sadly, it won’t be the last either.
@shug831
Жыл бұрын
@@GeeBeeMike in that case there should be a warning of "feathered props," once the leavers are moved or yellow warning light on the torque meters to highlight the prop condition.
@GeeBeeMike
Жыл бұрын
@@shug831 You cant miss the props being feathered or unfeathered. The noise in the cockpit is unmistakable when you either feather or disc-out the props.
@shug831
Жыл бұрын
@@GeeBeeMike well two experienced captain's failed to hear the difference. 😢
@NicolaW72
Жыл бұрын
@@shug831 Yes, indeed.
@_pjd
Жыл бұрын
Thank you for this video. I am learning to fly the ATR, and that accident gave me Goosebumps.
@EIGYRO
Жыл бұрын
Both the flap lever and the condition lever involve a lift and retard motion. The condition lever requires lift to raise the interlock/detent, and the flap lever requires a lift action to clear the detent. If the same grip is applied to the flap lever as to the condition lever( i.e., hand wrapped over ), I can see how the fault could occur. Also, from the Capt seat, he must normally reach over the condition levers to get to the flap lever. If he does a similar over-reach from the co-pilot seat, he might over-reach to the condition lever instead of the flap lever. The levers are not necessarily as different as it would appear they are. Also, the arc through which the flap lever is moving from 15 to 30, is similar to the arc from auto to feather on the condition lever. Add in stress,boredom,distraction, etc and ...... And then there are 'senior' moments...
@andrewashmore8000
Жыл бұрын
What you're saying makes the most sense , what a pity , things happened so fast not enough time to react.
@kcnairnair7299
Жыл бұрын
Was waiting to watch your video on this tragic crash, Capt. So sad....
@alw4755
Жыл бұрын
Thank you for your thorough explanations. What I cannot understand: how could they not hear and feel the prop mushing / RPM drop? Can this not be heard in the cockpit in the ATR when wearing ANR headsets?
@FlywithMagnar
Жыл бұрын
When the propeller is feathered in flights, the change in sound is more subtle than when feathering the propeller on the ground. And ANR headsets remove almost all sounds from the propellers and engines.
@alw4755
Жыл бұрын
@@FlywithMagnar Thank you. May I ask another question? How long would it have taken the prop regulator to unfeather once the pilots would have recognized the mistake?
@fenimorefillmore5322
Жыл бұрын
@@alw4755 yeah same qn
@gabrielcho999
Жыл бұрын
@@alw4755 I would say about 15 seconds.
@FlywithMagnar
Жыл бұрын
@@alw4755it's faster than on the ground. So around 15 seconds sounds reasonable.
@rubensosabetancor687
Жыл бұрын
I’ve been looking forward to your video about this matter, many thanks magnar!!
@benjaminsharma
Жыл бұрын
I had checked 12 days of flight performance about this particular aircraft in radder. Altimeter and Speedometer have not been working properly for many days. So i presume maintenance history should be examined to find the clue.
@evpilot89
Жыл бұрын
@Fly with Magnar Just to point out the possible reason on the altitud they were flying at, I was on the understanding that it was not just a visual pattern but a cycling approach. If it were the case, cycling approach will be flown on landing configuration at the MDA for circle to land on the chart for runway 30. I can't find the charts for the airport but I'm almost certain that the MDA will be the one they were flying at. Thanks for the excellent video and happy landings.
@kamranrizvi7670
Жыл бұрын
This is unbelievable that both CL were unlatched and brought back to feather position.
@johngreydanus2033
Жыл бұрын
I have heard the design criticized on other videos
@olasek7972
Жыл бұрын
@@johngreydanus2033nothing wrong with the design, every aircraft type with condition levers has exact same configuration
@kamranrizvi7670
Жыл бұрын
@@johngreydanus2033 ATR is the most successful aircraft with most advance systems specially its propeller system. Mechanical failure or human factor could lead to such disaster. I will be very keen to know the actual position of CLs found after crash in final investigation report.
@kxs7267
Жыл бұрын
Excellent explanation of a truly sad incident. The technical details particularly with the real life visuals and audio of the controls in operation really make it clear. And the timeline shows how it all happened in less than the time it takes to describe it. Thanks for all the work you put into these videos.
@arijit1989
Жыл бұрын
Thank you so much fir this video! Really gives a very good insight in the working of the ATR engine/prop controls. I have a question, in your experience, does the noise of the props change when they are feathered? I would assume the engine sound would be louder and probably drown out the prop noise, but maybe a prop (or two) that are not "biting" into the air will produce a different sound as compared to one that is working fine? I ask this to understand if there could be a aural feedback to the pilots that they feathered the props by mistake instead of lowering the flaps.
@thomasmaughan4798
Жыл бұрын
Prop noise on a turboprop is definitely the prominent sound. Feathered engines produce considerably less noise but it is the same pitch, frequency or whatever. It would become suddenly quieter but with sound canceling headphones it might not be noticed as much.
@christianfuchs9971
Жыл бұрын
@@thomasmaughan4798 I think for many pilots like myself the notion that the props were unexpectedly feathered in flight and NOT immediately noticed by either or both pilots is frankly perplexing. Noise cancelling headset would be irrelevant. As Capt. Magnar points out one does not easily confuse the prop condition levers with the flap lever, certainly not experienced pilots. This configuration of prop and flap lever is not unique to this airplane, on the contrary, it is very common. Feathered props would be noticed right away, it would sound different and would feel different, noticeably so on both counts not to mention that the airplane would fly differently. There were a lot of holes of the Swiss cheese model that lined up that day or in more modern terms the airplane quickly got into an undesirable (indeed unsafe) state and they did not notice much less correct it. Really bizarre.
@sebinamuwanga
Жыл бұрын
Thanks for the analysis and for helping us to understand the condition lever and feather properties. As you stated, the Human Factors aspect will be very important in this investigation. To me, Crew Resource Management is just as important because it is necessary to understand how the crew was communicating, making callouts, and cross-checking their instruments and selections made. I also hope that the report highlights how the crew reacted to the problem of lack of thrust due to the feathered propeller.
@rabidbigdog
Жыл бұрын
With that shocking control layout, it's frankly extraordinary that this exact scenario hasn't happened previously.
@hemanboruah2306
Жыл бұрын
You are a great analyst of the flight systems and procedures, a great detailed analysis
@ryansil5854
Жыл бұрын
At 10:56 there was a click sound. Like you said it can be come from a lot of things, can't it be possible to detect the pitch of the click sound and compare it with another same model aircraft? If you notice in the video demonstration every click is not in the same pitch.
@steve6375
Жыл бұрын
Note 4 says it was assumed to be them turning off Master Caution.
@NicolaW72
Жыл бұрын
@@steve6375 Indeed.
@a186236
Жыл бұрын
Thank you Capt. for your detailed description of this sad event and hard work on preparing this video.
@fenimorefillmore5322
Жыл бұрын
I was hoping you would make one video on this topic ever since you posted your comment on blancolorio channel. Thanks from Nepal 🇳🇵
@Saxxonknight
Жыл бұрын
Gotta say that is a great presentation and explanation of information. God rest the souls of those who lost their lives.
@jeffh5220
Жыл бұрын
I’m also a bit confused about the low altitude they were flying the visual approach at as well. I’m wondering if some human factors were already at play before they even entered the circuit.
@francoisjackson
Жыл бұрын
A circle to land approach tends to have an altitude minima lower than a visual circuit. The height the aircraft was flying in the approach at that point could be at the circling approach minima for that approach
@josephcameron530
Жыл бұрын
Very sad event. Excellent presentation of a terrible situation. Thank you.
@fingerhorn4
Жыл бұрын
Superb analysis. Thank you.
@jmowreader9555
Жыл бұрын
I’ve thought about this crash a bit. As to why the check airman would have called for the alternate approach…well, wind direction but also, since the left-seater was being evaluated could the check airman have called for the circling approach simply to test the trainee’s circling approach procedures? Anyone who can fly can do a straight-in approach.
@sohanmaharjan601
Жыл бұрын
Hi!Captain Magnar,Just few days back,I had put the questions about both propeller feathering during last leg of approaching regarding Yeti ATR crash in your mentor episode.however today you put clear picture of flap lever n condition lever.If it is so…I think we must improve in CRM also.I personally know IP very well.He was very sensitive Capt.He checks all the systems each n every minutes in flying.Of course ….. we loss.Thanks a lot.
@vibekguragain
Жыл бұрын
Is it possible that PM was trying to cross examine the PF because she needed to get clearance to fly to the new airport in the ATR aircraft? It is suspicious act from the investigation team since they are not releasing CVR and providing context of what was being exchanged between those two pilots. There were some news reports stating the PM and PF were having non professional conversation. Its tragic accident we need to get the root cause as Captain Magnar said in this video.
@akergincelik8066
Жыл бұрын
Bro in Nepal you will never get root cause. They should conduct root cause analysis.
@peterbrown6224
Жыл бұрын
Thank you for the hard work and insight you bring to all your videos.
@brandonvereyken4869
Жыл бұрын
In the restaurant business I train people to call a food request and the receiver calls back the entire same phrase so the caller can confirm that it was heard correctly. No matter how many times I tell them or how carefully I explain the logic of the system, they just can't be bothered to do it right. Luckily the consequence in our industry is a wrongly made or even a missed hamburger not dead bodies and grieving families. But mistakes or missed steaks, I can assure you that laziness, muscle memory, and confirmation bias are real. Remember- NEVER HAVE A WEAKDAY. MAKE EVERYDAY A FLYDAY!
@federicoprice2687
Жыл бұрын
Great comment Brandon. Yes, similar "human factors" incidents occur in many different trades, so it's great that you pointed out your own problems. 👍
@fidelcatsro6948
Жыл бұрын
yes simple commands and feedback like these can also help save more than burgers, prevent humans from burgering themselves too
@rookiebird9382
Жыл бұрын
Excellent video. It brings back the good old memories when I was flying Seneca twin in the flight school.
@Macepur
Жыл бұрын
What about a mistake in the ATPCS? Maybe both engines were autofeathered when the CL’s were in AUTO, so that’s why they couldn’t understand why they didn’t have any power?
@FlywithMagnar
Жыл бұрын
There have been incidents where one propeller has been feathered for no apparent reason (uncommanded autofeather). However, it is unlikely that this will happen to both engines at the same time.
@Macepur
Жыл бұрын
@@FlywithMagnar Yes unlikely, but not impossible if there was a bug in the software...
@NicolaW72
Жыл бұрын
@@Macepur In this case there´s the need to explain why the Pilot Monitoring stated at this exact time: "Flaps 30 and descending" after the Pilot Flying had requested him to do so - and no movement of the Flaps to 30 were visible at that time. Basically: That reduces the possibility of a technical reason to Zero. As the Preliminary Report states: They will have to investigate the Human Factors in this Case.
@FlywithMagnar
Жыл бұрын
@@Macepur, the autofeather systems are individual for each engine. Therefore, a dual uncommanded autofeather is unlikely. The report states that both propellers went into autofeather after both pilots called for flaps 30. The flaps didn't move. Instead, both propellers feathered.
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