Skepticism and inference to the best explanation: kzitem.info/news/bejne/zZ5vmaRjhmlll6Q Moore's argument against skepticism: kzitem.info/news/bejne/ym2w2mGqfouhooo Memory skepticism: kzitem.info/news/bejne/kWNrmKyrgYNlgoI Global debunking arguments: kzitem.info/news/bejne/p3yXtYmOcoKbg5w
@turtledruid464
11 ай бұрын
I think ultimately, the problem with Boltzmann Brains is the same problem that crops up any time you try to compare a finite set to an infinite one. If we suppose that the universe is unending then we end up in a situation where, compared to the infinite duration of the universe, the proportion of time occupied by a more sensible universe (in which you and I really exist) is mathematically zero. The actual likelihood of the existence of Boltzmann Brains is irrelevant so long as it isn't zero, and current scientific theories by their nature cannot unilaterally disprove the possibility of anything (for some definition of disprove, anyway). The natural consequence is that we should consider evidence in favor of B-theories as being essentially worthless, as it has no impact on our ultimate conclusion on the question, which in my view gives us cause to dismiss the theory out of hand. If the foundation of B-theories is empirical evidence, but any amount of empirical evidence does not change the conclusion (i.e. the hypothesis is unfalsifiable), then we conclude that empirical evidence has in fact nothing to say on the matter and that it provides essentially zero evidence in support of the hypothesis beyond pure supposition. Or something like that anyway; I'm not a philosopher, I'm just trying to sound smart on the internet.
@martinbennett2228
11 ай бұрын
I agree, the concept of infinity is inherently problematic. I have made another comment that fits in with your remarks.
@whatsinaname691
11 ай бұрын
It seems a little bit like an appeal to consequences to just say “this isn’t helpful to know, so it’s not worth considering”. Like, maybe empirical inquiry is just fleeting and this shows it? I don’t think we’re B Brains, but I don’t think that we can just disregard them as statistically irrelevant
@turtledruid464
11 ай бұрын
@@whatsinaname691 I'd agree under other circumstances, but when considering empirical scientific evidence specifically it's important to adhere to the constraints of that system. Scientific theories *by definition* cannot provide evidence for or against unfalsifiable claims, or at least they shouldn't be used that way. My argument only succeeds at calling the validity of the empirical evidence into question, which undermines it specifically because the driving thought behind the hypothesis is empirical evidence. The argument wouldn't work on a hypothesis justified any other way.
@whatsinaname691
11 ай бұрын
@@turtledruid464 A Multiverse is unfalsifiable
@turtledruid464
11 ай бұрын
@@whatsinaname691 I've never been a fan of the multiverse hypothesis and, to my knowledge, it's not a hypothesis that is ever presented as a scientific theory. In popular media the multiverse hypothesis is often portrayed as being a scientific fact that accompanies quantum mechanics, but this couldn't be further from the truth. Actual physicists view the multiverse hypothesis as a helpful heuristic that offers a hypothetical, but not necessarily true, way of thinking about quantum uncertainty. Saying that quantum physics provides solid evidence in favor of the multiverse hypothesis is factually incorrect, and I think most physicists would agree. Rather, quantum physics frames the problem for which the multiverse hypothesis is one of the many sufficient philosophical explanations, and the physics itself has no power to back any argument over any other insofar as they're consistent with the observed phenomena.
@petrusboniatus
11 ай бұрын
I have to recommend the Greeg Egan novel "Permutation City". He takes this concept ever further and says that any sufficienttly static large collection of data (as could be our universe) will produce a bolzman brain / universe like escenario. That's beacause you can allways find an interpretation of that data that supports any state. For instance an image (brain state) is the same image in png that in jpg but the flle binary is different, and you can create infinte image formats.
@СергейМакеев-ж2н
11 ай бұрын
My favorite part is when those simulated insects say "Screw you, we're not in your simulation, YOU're in OUR simulation!", and then, somehow, _the insects turn out to be right._ That's some serious existential dread.
@TheKingWhoWins
11 ай бұрын
That's some eight-legged freak stuff (film)
@Justjoey17
11 ай бұрын
A Boltzmann brain’s simulated universe wouldn’t necessarily have any reason to be consistent. Our world seems pretty consistent
@rsm3t
11 ай бұрын
At least, you "remember" it that way.
@bernardhurley6685
11 ай бұрын
Our most fundamental theories, general relativity and quantum mechanics are mutually inconsistent.
@uninspired3583
11 ай бұрын
@@bernardhurley6685 each of those theories is internally consistent in ways that seem implausible for a brain to track. The most likely case is that the theories are good but incomplete.
@saimbhat6243
11 ай бұрын
"Seems pretty consistent" begs the question where do you get the idea or concept of being consistent from? Every possible universe, no matter how wacky or inconsistent for us, will be consistent for its inhabitants. A human brain, striving to make world predictable and striving to use the world for his desires, has to evolve to see the physical world intuitive.
@heathflick8937
11 ай бұрын
But some would be consistent. Also, who says the universe that your mind could be forming in is itself consistent? You could be a mind simulating a consistent world in an inconsistent universe.
@Eatenbyfish
11 ай бұрын
It seems to me that the issue of Cognitive instability can be presented in the form of something like Pascal's Wager. If my experience and mind are unreliable, it's a lost cause. And if I assume that they don't work and in fact they do, that's not very good either, so it seems that I have to assume that my mind works, not because I can somehow demonstrate it, nor because there are no reasons to doubt it, but rather because it is the only solution. . In other words, when I get on a plane, even if I am aware of the risk of hypoxia, I have to fly it anyway, and I can only have a chance to successfully achieve this if I assume am mentally fit.
@ChemoProphet
11 ай бұрын
Fantastic video Kane, Thank you. An interesting implication of this is that if Boltzmann brains exist, then reincarnation is true. This does assume that the time period within which a Boltzmann brain can arise is infinite (or at least very long), and if I recall correctly (not a physicist) matter will exist as the universe enters a heat death, but will all eventually decay - presumably bringing an end to the conditions required for a Boltzmann brain to arise. But in either case, if there is a period of time wherein Boltzmann brains can exist, and each Boltzmann brain is an instance of a possible human consciousness, then it is at the very least a probability that the same consciousness-state will arise multiple times (infinity many if, indeed, the allowed time period is infinite - Hilbert's hotel experiment), and if "me" is my conscious experience at this moment, then that means it is probable that "I" will be reincarnated (as a Boltzmann brain). Of course, this is not the sort of reincarnation espoused by worldviews such as Buddhism, since each state is it's own self-contained thing, and cannot acquire any conscious/unconscious/spiritual knowledge from any pervious state. It is in a way closer to Friedrich Nietzsche's idea of eternal recurrence, although Nietzsche argued that my exact same experiences will repeat themselves (see The Gay Science and Thus Spoke Zarathustra) - in the Boltzmann brain scenario, ANY possible consciousness-state (including the one I am currently in) will necessarily be created (or at least a large number of them).
@fai8t
11 ай бұрын
boltzmann brain aka Atheists say universe is a coincidence
@SJSUPhilosopher
11 ай бұрын
Super video! It reminds me of The Consolation of Haldane and of eternal recurrence in Nietzsche & in the thought of the Ancient Greeks. For more on all this, I hope all who read this read page 206 in Carl Sagan's great book The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark.
@sirilandgren
11 ай бұрын
Sean Carroll points out that Nietzsche's Eternal recurrence was written at almost the exact same time as when Poincaré wrote about recurrence on a cosmic scale.
@Elisha_the_bald_headed_prophet
11 ай бұрын
It takes a very special set of constraints for a system to traverse all of phase space periodically
@whycantiremainanonymous8091
11 ай бұрын
I wonder if anybody actually did the math, though. It is perfectly possible that even in an infinite universe in thermal equilibrium (which, however, continues to expand, possibly with accelleration), the probability of a whole brain ever fluctuating into existence remains infinitesimally small. Another point: the whole observable universe could conceivably be a Boltzmann universe (that's actually more plausible than that a brain pops up).
@СергейМакеев-ж2н
11 ай бұрын
Plausibly, if a Boltzmann-Big-Bang turns out to be more probable than a Boltzmann brain, then most observers are indeed normal people (in new patches of space produced by those Big Bangs), so we're fine. That's why Sean Carroll says that the Boltzmann brain consideration helps us distinguish "good multiverses" from "bad multiverses".
@MacSmithVideo
11 ай бұрын
I don't see the problem. I also don't assume I really have hands.
@sapphicbunny7538
11 ай бұрын
I don't know if it really matters whether or not I am a Boltzmann's Brain. As long as there is a chance I'm a normal brain I should live as though I am.
@wahwah12wahwah12
11 ай бұрын
tl;dr: lol, we dont know
@dumbledorelives93
11 ай бұрын
All of philosophy
@OBGynKenobi
11 ай бұрын
Do Boltzman Brains think about Boltzman Brains in infinite regression?
@andiralosh2173
11 ай бұрын
I do love pondering these seemingly irrefutable whatifisms. If we live in a game, so we play the game... and people find this uncomfortable for the reason I suspect all of this is uncomfortable. We don't have free will, as it's a meaningless concept. We decide as much as a disembodied brain in our own reality, as we do born to random circumstance. That said, when I am in a dream, round triangles make sense, as does transition from one room to another continent. This could be the dreaming state, for all we know. By way of whatifism, anything is possible, and much is probable when we deny observation or the need of a proved example
@sirilandgren
11 ай бұрын
As a Carrollite, I really appreciate hearing about this from a note philosophy-centric angle. Thank you!
@Kyssifrot
6 ай бұрын
I might misunderstand the critics, but isn't it extremely unlikely that a Boltzmann brain's universe would create the conditions for us to understand it and come to the conclusion that Boltzmann brains are likely? I mean, if BB need the set of conditions [X] to exist, why would the phenomenological experience of BB be consistent with [X]. Seems unlikely to me.
@dolltron6965
8 ай бұрын
This boltzmann brain thing reminds me of singularities in a black hole. They are important in the sense that our theories are probably wrong. Infinity seems like an error , it comes up to show you your maths is wrong or you are missing a vital piece of the puzzle. How exactly does a brain survive in the vacuum of a hostile space with no body or blood supply enough to even form any useful function? it would immediately freeze solid and die faster than it could generate a single coherent thought . I assign 0% probability. The same as 0% probability that you could survive a nuke going off next to your head, no matter how many people blow a nuke up next to there head , infinite nukes and infinite people = infinite dead people. So it is too with the brains, they might form but none of them are doing anything but being a sort of temporary space cancer that resembles a brain but isn't because the conditions of a thinking brain like ours is precisely the result of being in a real universe like ours.
@swank8508
11 ай бұрын
the issue of a boltzmann brain fizzling out in 1 second is not needed. in a B theory, the (infinite) number of boltzmann brains that last 100 years will still far outnumber the (infinite) amount of boltzmann universes
@cripplingautism5785
2 ай бұрын
What is the basis for the assumption that non-human animals are conscious, which the claim that most observers are nonlinguistic is based on? This hasn't been proven. Maybe you should consider the possibility that they aren't, which is what anthropic reasoning seems to suggest. Instead you reason based on that unjustified assumption that anthropic reasoning is wrong without even considering that the assumption of animal consciousness could be. It is a very widespread assumption today, but that's about all it has going for it.
@kennethconnally4356
11 ай бұрын
The idea of Boltzmann brains seems to be premised on the idea that, in an infinite future of random fluctuations of matter and energy, brains precisely like mine but sans a body or surrounding environment will arise zillions of times more often than those that arise along with a body and an appropriate environment for my sense-perceptions not to be illusory. But I've heard that mathematicians don't think there are more integers than there are even numbers. The common-sense view is that there are twice as many, but since there's an infinite amount of both and they're the same kind of (countable) infinity, there actually ends up being the same amount of them (so I'm told). The same goes for multiples of a zillion: same amount of those as there are integers. So if that's right, in an infinite future, doesn't every event with a nonzero probability occur an equal number of times? And if that includes events in which the entire observable universe as it appears to me now (or as it appears to have been at some past time) leaps into existence through the random fluctuations, and if the observable universe, having leapt into existence, would be able to continue on under its own steam just as we would expect it to, then must I still conclude that I'm a disembodied brain experiencing a brief moment of consciousness in otherwise empty space rather than an embodied brain in a real universe? Am I really "more likely" to be one kind of brain than the other if there aren't really going to be more of that kind of brain in existence?
@SynaTek240
11 ай бұрын
I think the hypoxia example does not really show the cognitive instability argument to be absurd, because the belief that if you have hypoxia you couldn't arrive at the conclusion that you have hypoxia is weak, it's totally possible to come to that conclusion, but the steps in the arguments for boltzmann brain instability are all at about 100% where it absolutely annihilates the legs upon which it stands, which is not the same at all in my opinion for hypoxia
@KaneB
11 ай бұрын
The claim isn't that if you have hypoxia, you couldn't arrive at the belief that you have hypoxia. It's that if you believe you have hypoxia, you have to stop trusting your own reasoning, which undermines your justification for holding that belief. Whatever reasons you have cited in favour of the belief cannot be trusted. This seems analogous to the case of Boltzmann brains. The claim is not that a Boltzmann brain would be unable to form the belief, "I am a Boltzmann brain." After all, the Boltzmann brain is identical to your brain, so it can do whatever you can do. Rather, it's that as soon as you come to the conclusion that you are a Boltzmann brain, you undermine the evidence that justifies arriving at that conclusion.
@CognitiveOffense
11 ай бұрын
Great video. Such a bubbly topic, full of joyful possibilities. As a Boltzmann brain having popped into existence from the quantum foam, I think it is far too fizzy and effervescent to get anything accomplished. I guess I'll wait for the next incremental iteration of whatever it is that I am to luck into something less fleeting.
@luszczi
11 ай бұрын
Such a terrifying topic, full of dreadful implications. Zillions of Boltzmann brains experience the greatest imaginable suffering. Sleep tight.
@YargGlug
8 ай бұрын
The brain would also need a body to support it. It won't be able to function otherwise.
@jffryh
11 ай бұрын
I could accept that smaller things generally are more likely to pop into existence than larger things. So planets would be more likely than galaxies, but human brains despite being smaller than planets I think could be more complex than galaxies, so therefore likely to pop into existing much less frequently than galaxies
@MrVaypour
11 ай бұрын
Following from your comment, given that almost everything has its own personal likelyhood of occuring, & of course things that are more likely should occur many times more then things that are not. With this in mind we should then be able to see a uniform sequence in order of all things that exist, an almost pyrimidical diagram with the top being the rarest & lower down more often. Do we live in such a universe?
@jffryh
11 ай бұрын
@@MrVaypour the ratios of different kinds of things existing relative to other kinds of things seems to change with the age of the universe. Today, human brains existing in human bodies in the surface of a planet might be relatively more common than disembodied brains in deep space. I'm not so sure how different that ratio might be after universal heat death
@able_wire_gaming_streams
4 ай бұрын
but with an infinite universe it will eventually happen.. due to time being never ending so all things will happen eventually
@jffryh
4 ай бұрын
@@able_wire_gaming_streams sure but less frequently, unless if our current understanding of physics is wrong in some way so it might turn out such things were really impossible
@able_wire_gaming_streams
4 ай бұрын
@jffryh I think it's more likely that we are not brains... just because going smaller or bigger into something or out... and they all form complex structures like brain cells ect.. don't mean that a brain will happen.... nature's natural shapes are all symmetrical and very co.plex.. never a straight line... lines are man-made... complex bent shapes are natural and common in nature.. so brain like structures can form.. don't mean they function like a brain...
@ZoiusGM
11 ай бұрын
0:43 I just can't accept this. A monkey which is a system can only do what its initial state allows it to do. It has rules. No matter how much time is spent, if it's initial conditions don't allow for it to write a Shakespeare work, it will not: it isn't a certainty that it will given infinite time. I guess based on this I can't accept that a Boltzman brain will definitely arise.
@KaneB
11 ай бұрын
The monkey is just illustrative. We're supposing to imagine that it's tapping keys completely at random. If you generate random letters for a long enough time, eventually you'd expect to produce the complete works of Shakespeare. Given an infinite time, the probably of generating the complete works of Shakespeare is 1. Though it's worth noting that "probability 1" is not quite the same as certainty. An infinite sequence without the works of Shakespeare is a possible outcome; indeed, an infinite sequence of just the letter "A" is a possible outcome. (Look up the concept of "almost surely" in probability.)
@ZoiusGM
11 ай бұрын
@@KaneB The reason I wrote what I wrote was because I think I'm a neccesetarian; and modal anti-realist. However, I admit that I don't understand how a modal anti-realist sees the concept of probability (the maths), but also in general (1). In my mind right now I have the suspicion - whether it's true or not - that modal anti-realists don't want to entertain talk of probability. I haven't found a SEP for that (1); though there is one for interpretations of probability if I remember correctly. So if you see this comment, do you have any papers or articles that are about interpretation of probability and its mathematics by a modal anti-realist?
@Opposite271
11 ай бұрын
@@ZoiusGM One way to deal with this would be subjectivism. Probabilities and possibilities depend on the relation between how much your mind knows and how the world de facto is. You can accept Antirealism and still allow the Idea that there are facts about probability and possibility like the monkey theorem just that those facts partially depend on mental state of affairs. If your knowledge increases then the probability and possibility of something happening might change as well.
@ZoiusGM
11 ай бұрын
@@Opposite271 Are you referring to Baysean Epistemology? --/-- I didn't look the term, but if it exists then wouldn't it (subjectivism) be considered a fact? Isn't it obvious that the probabilities we make are based kn our available information? ---/--- If I want to see how modal anti-realists see probabilities, where do I start? Any sources? Especially on the necessetarian side.
@Beth_OMette
3 ай бұрын
The Basilisk... yes, that one.
@hermannvessey3497
6 ай бұрын
Who's to say that the memories made my real people aren't replayed an infinitely many times by exact copies of that persons' mind bilions of years in the future? I guess i don't understand the objection to b- theory that says you cannot learn you are a boltzman brain without disproving b theory, it seems more likely that every person's pattern of consciousness would exist many times over in some part of space and time
@hermannvessey3497
6 ай бұрын
*By* not my
@justus4684
11 ай бұрын
🧠
@KaneB
11 ай бұрын
How do you always see these videos so quickly lol
@justus4684
11 ай бұрын
@@KaneB Notifications on, fast fingers for content I am hyped for, philosophy student with much free time on my hands😎
@anthonyspencer766
11 ай бұрын
So, I tend to think Moore's response is the right one, and although I've just learned about Carroll's during the course of watching this video, I also find his argument compelling. I'll say something about the hypoxia counterexample to his argument first. The difference has to do with intuitions. While experience can teach us what a low-oxygen state feels like, such that we can remember if it happens again, for the most part we intuit our distress non-inferentially. Perhaps if we recognize the symptoms, we infer hypoxia. But, it is the conjunction of intuitive (non-inferential) distress with our inferences that prevents us from believing we might be wrong about our hypoxia, when we are hypoxic, in fact. Carroll's cognitive instability is a strong argument because it doesn't depend on any abnormal conditions. B-theories become unstable even for an ideal human reasoner (with good brain oxygen levels). Therefore, it pertains to reasoning per se, not impinged reasoning. I tend to take Moore's approach as having to do more with a metaphilosophical point about the reliability of incorrigible intuitions versus rational inferences. I take it to support phenomenal conservatism. I would also question the strength of the empirical support for B-theories. For one, you seem to require both infinite past and future. Finite past, finite future cosmologies don't support B-theories as far as I can tell. Another consideration would be that increasing entropy corresponds with decreasing free energy, G. Second, you might think we could be conservative with interpretations of statistical mechanics, such that chanciness does not translate "up" to every scale length of reality. As your scale length increases, you reach a scale in which randomness does not get you an explanation for any phenoemna at this scale, at least not proximally (nor does this entail that things can't *seem random at that scale). For example, even in a "late" universe scenario, we should not think that random variations result in actually different patterns of distribution of particles for the whole universe. Nor should we think that arrangements of matter in things like brains can result from chance processes. You'll need a stronger causal principle for this, but I think even a fairly meager one could get you there. I am even more skeptical about B-theories than Kane is about possible worlds talk.
@KaneB
11 ай бұрын
I don't see any appeal in taking a Moorean line against a B-theory. I think the whole Moorean strategy would be undermined if it were just as legitimately targeted against empirical theories. Not that I'm a fan of Moorean arguments in general - but I do at least understand why other folks find them persuasive. To me though, this rests on being able to make a distinction between philosophical and empirical theories. There have just been too many cases where science has successfully overturned common sense. Moreover, the parts of B-theories that are counterintuitive concern domains that are far removed from ordinary experience (very low probability events in the very long distance future), so there is no reason to expect our intuitions to be reliable here. Having said that, I think a Moorean response might be plausible against the inference from a B-theory to the conclusion that I am almost certainly a Boltzmann brain. In order to make that inference, it seems that we need principles such as phenomenal internalism and the self-locating indifference principle, and those are contentious philosophical principles. Re the hypoxia example, I'm not sure I understand what you take the relevant difference to be. No doubt, there are indicators of hypoxia that are in some sense available to me, whereas this is not the case for Boltzmann brains, since my Boltzmann brain duplicate is literally identical in terms of brain states. I might remember the feeling of hypoxia or just intuit distress. (Actually, at least as Kotzen describes it, hypoxia often tends to improve a person's confidence. So I probably wouldn't intuit distress.) But the problem is that, if I come to believe that I have hypoxia, I cannot take it that either of these things or any other thing supports that conclusion. Now we can frame this in terms of ideal reasoners, and in that case, the hypothesis "I have hypoxia" would not be unstable. But this is just because, by stipulation, an ideal reasoner wouldn't suffer any cognitive deficits due to their hypoxia. In any case, I'm not an ideal reasoner. So it's still cognitively unstable for me. I have no opinion on whether B-theories are empirically supported. That's not really a question that interests me to be honest. Though I don't think it would be possible for a person to be more skeptical of B-theories than I am of possible worlds.
@anthonyspencer766
11 ай бұрын
@KaneB @KaneB So, maybe I can agree with your distinction between B-theories per se and the inference from them to the conclusion that I am likelier than not to be a Boltzman brain - as far as Moore goes. Most of the time, when people talk about probabilities as time approaches infinite increments, I just want to throw my hands up. I mean, maybe? I always find myself thinking there is a reference class problem. Like, what is the event where a bunch of particles snap into existence in the right arrangement so as to produce a functioning brain? For that reason, I have never been terribly interested in the problem; it is kind of in that bin of annoying things that are intetesting *because they are problems. But this one is like cleaning out the trunk of my car...I just don't wanna. It doesn't help that I am not a physicalist. I am not convinced that even if particles snapped into existence to result in a structure atomically identical to a brain, that a brain is really what you'd get. Maybe I am a bit of a biologicist when it comes to this issue since I think this isn't just a question of the "vertical" direction but also the "horizontal" one. Brains are like brains because they always arise in a biological context, which is always a causal history (I also prefer a sort of Aristotelian modality, ala Graham Oppy). So, at that point, you might as well be talking about Boltzman worlds. I am about as equally compelled by B-theory skepticism as I am brain-in-vat varieties. There are infinite S propositions I can't disprove. I don't find the B-brain threat any likelier on account of statistics and arbitrary time lengths; it just doesn't fit with my metaphysics. Re: hypoxia comments, I was thinking that Carroll's argument is successful because it applies uniquely to the case of ideal reasoners, whereas the hypoxia example doesn't. Your point seems to be that once we are at the point of reasonbly inferring we have brain hypoxia, Carroll's argument has the implication that we can't think the belief is reliable, no matter what the full epistemic picture may be because once you hit cognitive instability, that's it. That's all you need. Maybe that's right. I guess I'd want to perhaps modify Carroll's argument, then, and say if your conclusion gets a sort of performative contradiction out of an *ideal reasoner, then you have the right sort of instability. And B-theories would get you this. But maybe I am mistaken about ideal reasoners. I wasn't thinking that ideal reasoners are omniscient, maybe just physical-facts omniscient.
@Taletad
11 ай бұрын
To your last argument, I would add that by necessity, all the boltzman brains will come to the same conclusion as me, but they won’t hold it for long as their capacity for existing will not last long. Thus I will be right for a statistically longer time than them, and from that I can infer that we will all come to the same conclusion, but only the real brain will be right for a statistically significant amount of time Of course I find all of theses arguments a bit silly, because there is 1.4*10^26 atoms in the brain, and the likelyhood of two sets of atoms this big coalescing in the same way is incredibly slim. It is already nigh improbable that two decks of cards have been shuffled the same way ever. Human brains are more than orders of magnitude more complex, and that’s even without factoring the probability of all the right atoms being in the right place and in the right proportions. Current scientific evidence points to boltzman brains as being almost impossible, and statistically impossible if the universe isn’t going to stay in a way where matter will coalesce into stuff for long enough (and we have evidence to supper that latter hypothesis)
@shm1wt
11 ай бұрын
I feel the argument re: synchronic disorder simply ignores the premise of the argument about B-theories, because surely the argument from SLI is that not simply most human brains but *most human brains experiencing the thoughts and sensations I am currently experiencing* are Boltzmann brains and not real human people. To argue that if you were a Boltzmann brain experiencing the same things you are currently experiencing you would in fact not be experiencing the same things you are currently experiencing is simply a non-sequitur and can be dismissed out of hand. The hypothetical reality of the two universes with the red or red and blue rooms illustrates this amply. The argument supposes one red room (out of a billion) in one universe, and a hundred red rooms (out of a hundred) in another - but this is not analogous to what B-theorists propose. In the B-theory, the quantum vacuum stage of the universe lasts for an arbitrarily long time, whereas the ordered stage of the universe immediately following the big bang lasts for a finite time. Therefore, no matter how many human brains exist in the ordered pre-vacuum universe, the ratio of "real" brains to boltzmann brains is arbitrarily large. Imagine a scenario in which, at some point in the future, all matter in the universe is used to build a computer that simulates human brains using some hypothetical technology. In that scenario, for every one of the unthinkably large number of simulated human brains in the computer, there will be, to all intents and purposes, an infinite number of identical Boltzmann brains in the distant future of that universe which are in *all respects identical* including having the same thoughts, feelings, emotions, and perceptions of the ordered-ness of their simulated world etc. While observing a red room, you meet God. He tells you that he has created you in one of two universes. In one universe are a hundred observers in red rooms. In another universe are an effectively infinite number of observers in red rooms, and for each one of those observes, a billion observers in blue rooms. Which universe do you think you are in?
@xBinderblackx
11 ай бұрын
With respect to cognitive instability, couldn't we say that what's inacceptable about B-Theories is not the existence of B-Brains, or the subsidiary theories that predicts their existence, but the acceptance of the Self Locating Indifference thesis for this particular case? In the scenario in wich the mayority of the observers are B-Brains, but in wich i am not one of them, the problems with respect the validity of evidence in favor of the existence of B-Brains do not arise. I think that this is the only possibility for accepting the theories that entail the existence of B-Brains. If the evidence in favor of those theories is actually evidence in favor of those theories, it is because i am not a B-Brain, so if the theory seeks to avoid plain contradiction, it must accept the fact that, however improbable, it must be the case that i am in the unlikely (but possible) scenario admited by the B-Theory: even though the mayority of observers are B-Brains, i am not one of them. I think this would be a case of having "independece evidence" against the Safe Locating Indifference thesis (because the apparently improable scenario actually becomes necessary, for it is the only one that doesn't imply contradiction).
@silverharloe
11 ай бұрын
Of course, even a tiny fraction of the infinite is, itself, infinite - unless comparing countable to uncountable, all infinite sets are the same size, so you're just as likely not a Boltzmann brain as you are one. That's just my stupid gut reaction. I haven't worked out the details, sorry. EDIT: My second stupid gut reaction is to treat this just like any other simulation hypothesis, from Descartes' demons on up to the matrix - if you can't tell the simulation from reality, then it just is your reality, and you might as well discard the simulation hypothesis as contributing nothing to helpful and get on with your life as if it were real (because to you, it is real)
@natsumenatsume8708
11 ай бұрын
I have a lot of problems with the B-Brain theories, but probably the biggest question mark is the assumption that the universe is similar to a box in thermodynamics where we can just say randomly fluctations of particles will form every state possible. This is problematic to me because the universe isnt like a container or box. We can easily assume there is nothing "outside" the universe and it isnt just a container with boundary conditions. There isnt even any objective frame to view the universe from.
@rsm3t
11 ай бұрын
If you believe you are a BB, then being right is small consolation. If you believe you are not a BB, then the only world that matters is the one you are right in.
@DeadEndFrog
11 ай бұрын
funny how the rationalist argument in the end comes to a similar conclusion to a pragmatist argument, eeen if it seems rather wierd from a rationalist perspective to be both 'rational' in their assesment and yet so removed from the actual truth of the matter.
@Arttano
11 ай бұрын
I feel like Boltzmann Brains really only pose a problem if you're committed to scientific realism. Couldn't a scientific anti-realist respond along the lines that since scientific inquiry is about building models instead of discovering how the world works Boltzmann Brains, while entailed by our models, don't necessarily exist. They could easily be a point where our models break down, for example.
@KaneB
11 ай бұрын
It depends on the kind of anti-realism. Take van Fraassen's constructive empiricism, which says that the aim of science is to construct theories that are true with respect to the observable phenomena. Boltzmann brains are observable, so it seems that a constructive empiricist who accepts a B-theory would be committed to believing in Boltzmann brains.
@uninspired3583
11 ай бұрын
Boltzman brains are a prediction of the math from quantum physics, but the fact is we don't see large objects popping into existence from quantum fluctuations. I take this to be a point against quantum physics being the complete picture of reality. There is more to it we don't understand, and what lays in the gap may explain why large objects don't appear. If boltzman brains are a false prediction, it breaks the cycle of inference to the best explanation breaking itself.
@KaneB
11 ай бұрын
We wouldn't expect to see that though, since the probabilities are so low. If we stick around for 10^10^10^10 years and we still don't see it, that might be a problem!
@uninspired3583
11 ай бұрын
@@KaneB i would argue that it isn't just a matter of time. Without observing the effect it is speculation, no stronger than a hypothesis.
@Opposite271
11 ай бұрын
Statistical mechanics also predicts the reversal of entropy by statistical fluctuations. So it is not clear if we even need quantum mechanics for the Boltzmann scenario to work out.
@uninspired3583
11 ай бұрын
@@Opposite271 again, prediction without validation is just speculation
@Opposite271
11 ай бұрын
@@uninspired3583 Do you hold the opinion that if nobody has observed e that therefore e’s existence is mere speculation even if it’s existence is predicted by multiple bundles of our best scientific theories? Edit: And does one’s potential ability to observe e without actually having observed e increases the likelihood of its existence? If so for what reasons would this be the case? Edit2: Does the observation of similar entities or events in the past count as a validation of a particular entity or event that has not been observed but predicted by our best scientific theories?
@michaelzahir5374
10 ай бұрын
I think it's plausible that BBs and Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles could be the foundation of a metaphysical theory and the resolution of the cognitive instability argument. I would hold it's plausible that in an "original" universe in thermodynamic equilibrium, "every" BB that has the same experiences are, by there own lights, the same brain. And new time lines (consisting of sequences of different BBs) can be constructed independent of the original universe, in which time has ceased to have functional meaning due to thermodynamic equilebreum. This would be consistent with our notion of counterfactuals, there could be several BBs in closely related configurations. And our internal coherence because once a BB is fixed it has an internal model that can only evolve in internal subjective time not discontinuously jump.
@ЛевНиколаевичъ
11 ай бұрын
what about boltzmann god?
@absupinhere
11 ай бұрын
If god isn’t physical, but the reason why the domain of physics exists, then he won’t be materially realized, randomly or otherwise. He’s supposed to be entirely beyond the physical world, so heatdeath won’t effect him anyway haha
@KaneB
11 ай бұрын
If you think that God can be realized by a finite combination of particles, then yeah, you should expect a Boltzmann God. This would probably deviate significantly from what most people mean by "God", though.
@TheGlenn8
11 ай бұрын
It would still be bound by physical laws so actually probably no.
@SynaTek240
11 ай бұрын
I have yet to watch the entire video, but this is the first time I'm coming across this argument, very interesting argument indeed. An immediate objection I have though is that sure physics predicts infinite boltzmann brains, but does it not also predict infinite earths in an infinite universe with infinite bodies and so forth, and I would imagine, don't know though, but would imagine that the probability of an earth forming in a given area of space is greater than that of a boltzmann brain
@SynaTek240
11 ай бұрын
Edit: Just thinking about this objection I think I understand why it isn't correct, my assumption that the universe is as old as it is, would just be an illusion if I were a boltzmann brain and there is much more time in the heat death than otherwise and in the heat death of the universe the probability of an earth forming asymptotically reaches zero where it doesn't for boltzmann brains, I presume?
@SynaTek240
11 ай бұрын
Edit 2: But there should still be infinite earths because there is infinite space right now, so the question is which infinity is larger, do we say that infinite space x time is larger than just infinite space and therefore boltzmann brains?
@TheBlenderblob
11 ай бұрын
could the T3 in the (T1 + T2) problem just be physicalism vs dualism. This also solves the hypoxia problem.
@roger5442
11 ай бұрын
Interesting video as always - thanks Kane. The only point/objection I think I have is that I thought the Boltzmann brain scenario is a "prediction" in regards to the future of the universe. You started out by pointing out that the state of the universe would need to be in the high entropy state - but that isn't the current state. So I guess I am missing the inference that we should conclude we are Boltzmann brains now, given it's a prediction of the future. ie: because it's only a prediction of the *future state of the universe I don't actually think there is reason to think one is a Boltzmann brain *now. But maybe I'm missing something.
@whatsinaname691
11 ай бұрын
The idea that we’re in a low entropy state would be called into question by the Boltzmann Brain theory.
@roger5442
11 ай бұрын
@@whatsinaname691 I don't see why. If the data shows we're in a low entropy state then I think it seems the most reasonable conclusion is that one isn't a Boltzmann Brain.
@michaelzahir5374
10 ай бұрын
@@roger5442 I think this would be related to the instability argument against a BB. The data that were in a low entropic universe (plus theory) also support the universe will eventually consist of zillions of BBs. However, if you were a BB the data you have for the universe being in a low entropic state would be unreliable. Thus, the BB conclusion is unstable.
@eshansingh1
11 ай бұрын
This is interesting but I find the idea that current scientific understanding of physics is a B-theory is not supported well. [Current well supported physics + the universe is infinite in space + the universe is infinite in time + the universe will enter heat death + random fluctuations will be completely uniform random samples over particles + random fluctuations can result in temperature increases + temperature increases from random fluctuations can be extreme enough to create heavy elements] plus I'm sure a lot more assumptions than I can think of with only a layman's scientific understanding is a B-theory, I accept that idea. But a good number of those ideas aren't well supported by evidence, only merely not contradicted by evidence. I dislike the conflation and the sweeping under the rug of the sheer number of assumptions required for this to work near the beginning of the video. The rest of the video is really good however.
@KaneB
11 ай бұрын
I explicitly stated that this only arguably follows from currently accepted theories, and also that I would not be covering this aspect of the topic in the video. I don't think it's fair to characterise this as "conflation and sweeping under the rug". I'm a philosopher, not a scientist, and what interested me was exploring what philosophical challenges would arise *if* our current theories were B-theories. If folks are interested in the scientific details, there are plenty of other places they can go.
@eshansingh1
11 ай бұрын
To be clear, my criticism was not that you didn't suffeciently expand upon the science. My criticism was only that you used terms a bit loosely, as you state multiple times throughout the video, but particularly when expanding upon why Boltzman brains pose a greater challenge than ordinary skepticism does. You did not say something to the effect of "if our evidence *eventually leads us* to a B-theory", but sloppier statements that could be understood as arguing that current science is a B-theory, even though I understand that that is not in fact your position. Essentially I don't think you placed a strong enough emphasis on the fact that this is a hypothetical to begin with. To be more specific, this is not anything approaching a refutation, merely something I wish would've been made a bit clearer in your use of rhetoric.
@KaneB
11 ай бұрын
@@eshansingh1 Sure, if people simply ignore what I say earlier in the video, then parts of that section might be misleading to them. That's not something I'm too troubled by, and your characterization of the video still seems unfair to me. It's strange to accuse me of sweeping things under the rug just because other people might ignore me when I make the relevant qualifications.
@Felipecamargo13579
11 ай бұрын
I don't really get the point of comparing probabilities about (equally) infinite possibilities. If there are infinite conherent bolttzmann brain experiences and infinite chaotic bolttzmann brain experiences, how can one conclude that it is more likely for a bolttzmann brain experience to be chaotic? The same applies for the other similar arguments. If there are infinite human experiences (on a planet just like earth in a galaxy just like Via Lactea etc) and infinte bolttzmann brain experiences, why believing that it is more likely for us to be bolttzmann brains?
@Opposite271
11 ай бұрын
I have a ratio of 2/3. Now I have a ratio of 2x/3x. And now x approaches Infinity. It now seems that I still have a ratio of 2/3.
@Felipecamargo13579
11 ай бұрын
@@Opposite271 i get the intuition, but aren't both, in fact, the exact same quantity?
@Opposite271
11 ай бұрын
@@Felipecamargo13579 I must admit that my argument does not show that the ratio of two infinite sets can take the form of every rational number. Instead it only shows that if two finite sets have unlimited growth, that the ratio can be conserved. But the question is, do we engage with a actual or with a merely potential infinity? I think if one pictures the infinite possibilities not as something that actually exists but instead as concepts that could be potentially constructed, then the ratio would still be conserved.
@KaneB
11 ай бұрын
The intuitive idea can be illustrated like this: There are infinite composite numbers and infinite prime numbers. Still, if you were to select a number at random from the whole set of natural numbers, it would probably be a composite number. Maybe this doesn't make sense -- certainly, in practice we can't select at random from the whole set of natural numbers. I'm not a mathematician, but I think that they have ways of dealing with this kind of thing.
@EdgarQer
11 ай бұрын
🧟♂️
@bernardhurley6685
11 ай бұрын
Problems, like the problem of Boltzmann brains, if indeed they are problems can de seen as being generated by a particular form of scientific realism. I don’t see the problem with scientific models that “jam together” various theories that may or may not mutually be consistent (provided one has some way of dealing with the inconsistency). The key criterion for such models being useful is empirical adequacy, which I always take to be in some domain of application. Boltzmann brains arise from extending a theory’s domain of application to areas which cannot, even in principle, be tested for empirical adequacy. I can’t see the motivation for doing this unless one is committed to some sort of scientific realism.
@Opposite271
11 ай бұрын
The thing is, even without the support of science this would still be a skeptical scenario in the sense of. -If I don’t know not-S then I don’t know P. -I don’t know not-S. -Therefore I don’t know P. And if I where a Boltzmann brain, then scientific theories are neither useful nor true, so why engage in scientific theorizing?
@bernardhurley6685
11 ай бұрын
@@Opposite271 Agreed. But that wasn’t the point I was trying to make. On the surface it would seem that a thorough going scientific realism, especially w.r.t. our best fundamental theories, leads to skepticism. The phenomenon is interesting for a number of reasons. The first is that many scientific realists see themselves as “hard nosed” realists, who are prepared to dismiss without compunction all these silly skeptical concerns. Another is that it is the sort of skepticism that does not require previous concessions on peripheral issues. Take, for instance, the “brain in a vat” scenario. To formulate this seems to require that we can talk meaningfully about such things as brains, vats, and mad scientists and it can be claimed that the skeptic is forced to make a lot of concessions about the real world in order to even formulate the argument and this may be taken to indicate that the skepicism is disingenuous. However a “Boltzmann brain” skeptical argument has the necessary background assumptions built in, as it were. However the background assumptions, depending on how you take scientific realism, can be quite sparse. It is enough for the scientific realist to claim that the universe is described on a large scale by a solution to Einstein’s gravitational equations and at another level by some sort of statistical mechanics. Some of these solutions are quite unlike anything we could envisage. For instance, Godel’s solution to the gravitational equations describes a four dimensional universe, two of which are time dimensions. Boltzmann brains could exist in infinitely many such possible universes and the mere fact that to the brain the universe seems to have the features we ordinarily take it to have is no guarantee that it does. Scientific anti-realism has a certain amount of scepticism built in. This built in scepticism seems to block the argument to a full blown skepticism via Boltzmann brains.
@Opposite271
11 ай бұрын
@@bernardhurley6685 If the scientific community would archive a consensus that implies that there are far more Boltzmann brains then ordinary observers in the total history of the universe, then this might be a problem for a global scientific realist. But I am not sure how this will impact a local realist. A entity realist for example might protest that no one has actually ever interacted with a Boltzmann brain. So the local realist might be able to have their slice of the cake and eat it too. But generally, extrapolating the trends observed in the cosmic history so far to a considerably longer timescale with entities one has never come into contact with might be a little bit too tin as that any tribe of scientific realism could believe in it.
@chullupa
11 ай бұрын
Without protection and energy a boltzman brain will quickly disintegrate
@martinbennett2228
11 ай бұрын
As Descartes pointed out, arguing for idealism, the concept of infinity poses a problem for empiricism, because the idea of infinity is (perhaps by definition) outside of observable experience. However by the same token it is hard to see how any empirical consequences can be derived from the undefined concept of infinity. The 'Boltzmann Brain' argument (Boltzmann would have hated to have his name attached to it) depends on an argument from a concept of infinity. This makes it an idealist proposition (somewhat akin to the ontological argument); sure enough the idea of the actuality of a 'Boltzmann Brains' exists, but an idea cannot transmute into existence.
@nevetstrevel4711
11 ай бұрын
You make these way to dry and boring. Philosophy is way more interesting than this
@KaneB
11 ай бұрын
As John Cage once said, "If something is boring after two minutes, try it for four minutes. If still boring, try it for eight. Then sixteen. Then thirty-two. And so on. Eventually one discovers that it is not boring at all."
@Joey21363
10 ай бұрын
Speak for yourself, man. I find these types of videos super interesting.
@absupinhere
11 ай бұрын
I’m pretty sure the brain is made of more complex elements than will exist during heat death, but a fun idea nevertheless
@KaneB
11 ай бұрын
Given a sufficiently long time, those elements will fluctuate into existence.
@enpassant-d3y
11 ай бұрын
hi kane, i love your videos. but i notice a lot of them are summaries of existing philosophy on existing subjects. i really liked your 'answering absurd trolley problems' video cause it introduced a new element of your own subjective perspective. so (as one viewer) i'd suggest doing some vids where you introduce your own philosophy ideas
@KaneB
11 ай бұрын
That's what I enjoy doing the most though. I don't like coming up with my own ideas.
@pookz3067
11 ай бұрын
@@KaneBThis same reason I didn’t end up in math academia for long after my PhD haha. I loved learning about the new mathematical research out there but hated being stuck for months thinking about my own research when I could spend that time learning so much more of others’.
@richard_d_bird
11 ай бұрын
if a solitary brain poofed out of nothing, in a vacuum, how long would it survive like that? have you ever put your brain in a vacuum? i bet it hurts.
@KaneB
11 ай бұрын
Good news! The brain has no nociceptors, so presumably wouldn't feel any pain. Even if it could, you'll almost certainly be consumed by the void before you experience any significant suffering.
@boobiduapp7272
8 ай бұрын
I would like to see some numbers. How many Boltzmann brains do we expect the universe to contain over its lifetime? Is the number LITERALLY INFINITE or is it finite? That makes a huge difference.
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