Many people think of free will as the foundation for just blame and punishment. If someone performs a harmful act of their own free will, then they should be blamed for it and deserve punishment. If the act was not performed in this way, then they are not responsible and should not be blamed. Of course, if everything we do is caused by brain function, then everyone should be able to exculpate themselves for everything they do by claiming “My brain made me do it!” In this lecture lawyer and psychologist Stephen Morse argues that the notion of free will makes no sense, and that in any case the law’s criteria for responsibility rest on the idea of rationality, not free will. Therefore, he argues, neuroscience in no way undermines traditional notions of criminal and civil responsibility.
Readings
Morse, S.J. (2004). New neuroscience, old problems: Legal implications of brain science. Cerebrum,
www.dana.org/news/cerebrum/det...
President’s Council on Bioethics Staff Working Paper: An Overview of the Impact of Neuroscience Evidence in Criminal Law (2004)
bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/...
Stephen J. Morse, J.D., Ph.D.
Dr. Morse is the Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell Professor of Law and a Professor of Psychology and Law in Psychiatry at Penn. He works on problems of legal and moral responsibility and their compatibility with the materialist worldview of neuroscience. He is interested in the roles of neuroscience and behavioral science in explaining and excusing antisocial and criminal behavior.
Негізгі бет Free Will, Responsibility, and Brain Function (Morse)
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