I agree the kidney example he repeatedly brings up is frustrating. I think he means it explicitly as a metaphor and not as an analogy. In other words, "claiming that a simulation of consciousness would be conscious is as absurd as claiming that a simulation of a kidney would pee." He would do well to more explicitly state that he means it strictly as a metaphor and not as a well defined argument, as it brings an opportunity for retorts such as "if I simulated kidney function and built a functional kidney (dialysis machine) and fed it blood then it would, in fact, pee on my desk."
@bradmodd7856
6 ай бұрын
A simulated human will be able to pee on your desk Bernardo....it might be orange-ade....if you are lucky
@Jacob-Vivimord
5 ай бұрын
A dialysis machine is performing a mechanical function. You have to buy the idea that awareness is a mechanical function to go any further.
@seintzeit
6 ай бұрын
The old commonplaces of dualism/monism at work here; Kastrup's arguments seem especially specious, a hodgepodge of pretty ordinary "idealist" commonplaces, and seductive to a demographic of KZitem "philosophy bros"...Jordon Peterson, self help, "consciousness" entrepreneurialism...
@bradmodd7856
6 ай бұрын
I am all for Kastrupian monism over dualism, but it doesn't conquer what I have boldly coined "the problem of the hard stuff" which idealism faces....and like the Physicist Rovelli says, it doesn't really matter what you call what the universe is reduced down to, mind, mentation, consciousness, energy, field etc.....the nomenclature doesn't make a difference to the scientists. The universal mind or universal field are both analogies so it becomes an aesthetic or moral choice. I am still grateful for Kastrup fighting for his nomenclature, nuance, morality etc.
@uninspired3583
7 ай бұрын
On the kidney example, I think what kastrup is saying here is that there's something about functionalism that jumps across the ontological gap, in the same way that a simulated kidney peeing on a desk jumps an ontological gap. It's kastrup's inability to see consciousness as anything other than substance in and of itself.
@RefinedQualia
7 ай бұрын
Love the video, Dr Brown, if you would please react to the debate between Tim Maudlin and Kastrup, that would be thrilling!
@onemorebrown
7 ай бұрын
I watched that one a while back...it was dissapointing that they couldn't make it work out because I was truly interested to hear what they might say to each other's views
@CatCambak
7 ай бұрын
You’re still alive lol. I watch a video of you from 7ys ago and was not sure. Hello.
@onemorebrown
7 ай бұрын
Yep! I've been sick the last few days but other than that, still kicking! (a not schizotypal that I know of, just a philosopher!)
@Xcalator35
7 ай бұрын
As allways, Richard's the adult in the room 😂
@rooruffneck
7 ай бұрын
It is so hard for me to understand identity theory in this context. I understand that we can say my dad is also a son. It is always easy for me to understand that kind of move when it doesn't jump logical types or ontological categories. But once we begin merging different kinds of things, I can't grasp it. Can anybody suggest something outside of the topic of consciousness in which we easily equate two different ontological kinds? I guess the way this question will be ignored is by somebody simply saying, "There is only one kind; physical" or information or whatever the person posits at the ground floor. That said, I've never heard an identity theorist describe the moment when a patch of matter became conscious in a way that doesn't implicitly acknowledge that something fundamentally new just happened. And 'new' in the sense that now we have to speak very differently about any conscious patches of matter we come across.
@Bhuyakasha
14 күн бұрын
What about a crowd? A crowd *is* just the people making up the crowd. Yet the crowd can be seen as if it has a mind of its own in crowd psychology. Whether you consider that as different enough kinds of things I don't know, but that's one of the more compelling examples I've found.
@rooruffneck
14 күн бұрын
@@Bhuyakasha I hear you. But a crowd doesn't make the ontological jump that I struggle with. I see your point about how it has its own mind and yet is made of many minds. But in that example, we never have to jump from one kind of 'stuff' to another and say they are the same thing. Thanks for getting my brain moving again.
@SpiritualAtheist
7 ай бұрын
I'm a lover not a liver.
@Simon-xi8tb
7 ай бұрын
19:35 - "Functionalism/materialism believes that the program running IS consciousness and not that it produces consciousness." I find this a bit weird. I am not sure if this is really what materialists believe, because it's a bit silly to think that way. Can someone confirm this is true ? Because the experience itself is categorically different from the neurons firing inside a brain or program running on a computer. Let's say i can observe the neurons firing inside some brain , I can still not experience what the brain is experiencing. I can still not see the experience if the firing of the neurons IS experience.
@oakschris
7 ай бұрын
Yes, that is what identity theorists believe. If you think that the brain instead produces something else, and that something else is conscious, you are probably a dualist. But an identity theorist thinks that the mind and the brain are different labels for the same thing, in the sense that Mark Twain is Samuel Clemons.
@rooruffneck
7 ай бұрын
Do identity theorists think that some configurations of matter are hiding things other than consciousness, but similar in the way that we would never be able to know about consciousness just by studying the objective reality of it?
@Mandibil
7 ай бұрын
38:30 Why is the "mind at large" seemingly so particularly concerned about dissociating itself on the surface of earth ?
@namero999
7 ай бұрын
Charles Babbage comes to mind...
@jocr1971
6 ай бұрын
bernardo is a sophist. he can only bedazzle with confused concepts. i posed the question once, "how can a unitary mind dissociate into many minds existing at the same time when no person ever displays multiple alters at the same time? ". the response was to direct me to another video which i had to watch in full to get a 30-second answer which answered nothing. the answer was parallel independent time lines. to which i asked, "how can timelines be independent and yet overlapping? dissociation into many independent minds existing simultaneously and yet being called parallel and independent is nonsensical." no further responses were directed to me.
@Jacob-Vivimord
5 ай бұрын
@@jocr1971 A split brain patients has two alters occurring at the same time. Or do you mean more than one alter occurring in a single region of spacetime (i.e. within one whole brain)? In that case, MAL is not limited by spacetime, as it encompasses the entirety of it.
@jocr1971
5 ай бұрын
@Jacob-Vivimord a mind could have 20 alters but only one can be in control of the physical body at a time. you couldn't have a superposition of all 20 being active at the same time(20 voices competing for the use of vocal cords simultaneously)....so how can universal mind split into many simultaneously active minds? to boot,universal mind can't really even be called mind. according to bernardo it is phenomenological mind. not conscious of itself or of anything else because it lacks meta-cognitive activity like self awareness.
@ReflectiveJourney
7 ай бұрын
Cant wait for the tjump rematch?. I dont think he will budge from his solipsism but it will be fun.
@anatolwegner9096
7 ай бұрын
Kastrup's position: just let's ignore all of modern physics and base our conception of reality on accounts of people having near death experiences and multiple personality disorders 🤦
@uninspired3583
7 ай бұрын
Tbf, modern physics is getting super counterintuitive, most common sense approaches don't fit. Personally I take this as a reason to dismiss common sense approaches, and come to terms with reality being a strange place.
@hiyoowihamainza949
7 ай бұрын
Well, he takes a Russelian type position where quantitative science proper doesn't tell us the categorical properties of objects, only dispositional. I.e., it's silent about intrinsic properties of objects, and only speaks on extrinsic or quantitative properties. It isn't inherently physicalist or idealist, which are positions about the intrinsic nature of things. You seem to be making the assumption that science can and does speak on the categorical or intrinsic properties of things.
@uninspired3583
7 ай бұрын
@@hiyoowihamainza949 close, but not quite. Kastrup is making claims here that consciousness has causal powers in a way that functionalism doesn't assert. Cause and effect is the domain of imperic science, he now has a burden of proof to demonstrate the causal powers of consciousness. The science tells us it's neurons that cause our muscles to move. Where does consciousness fit in to have a causal power here?
@hiyoowihamainza949
7 ай бұрын
@@uninspired3583 I was referring to the comment "Kastrup decided to throw away all of modern physics." The assumption in that claim is that idealism is incompatible with modern physics. I was pointing out modern physics, so understood as quantitative and under Russell's claim, does not speak of intrinsic properties. Modern physics doesn't support substance physicalism (a claim that *intrinsically* matter is physical) no more than it refutes substance idealism. It doesn't talk about substance. The idea that physics doesn't tell us what matter is, only what it does, can be found in his influential paper "The analysis of matter." As for your question, this is the question of mental causation. And if you take the position that mental states (consciousness) doesn't cause anything, then you're advocating eliminativism (consciousness doesn't exist because only existents have causal power) or epiphenomenalism (consciousness does exist, but it just doesn't do anything). Both positions seem dubious to my mind, but there's debate around this. All of this under assumption of the Eleatic Principle, which says, "To be is to be causal." I.e., that which does not cause does not have being. Where do you stand on this?
@anatolwegner9096
7 ай бұрын
@@uninspired3583 We have known that nature is counterintuitive at least since Galileo - (heavy and light objects falling at the same rate, frictionless motion etc.). But this is hardly a good reason to go all out 'mental' like Kastrup does.
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