A/V#16.04 2013 Spring
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This paper examines the development of Deleuze’s ontology of time from his early readings of Bergson to his reading of Nietzsche’s eternal return. Its central argument is that Deleuze ultimately finds Bergson’s ontology of duration, which he uses to ground the chronological passage of time, to be inadequate, and that Deleuze’s ultimate break with Bergson is precisely in favour of an ontology that ungrounds time’s chronological passage. The key in this respect is Bergson’s privileging of quality over quantity, by which he tries to establish an absolute separation of time and space, and his failure, as Deleuze will argue, to consider the possibility of a notion of intensive quantity that Deleuze finds in Nietzsche. While Bergson promises that duration escapes the linear time of mechanical causality and explains time’s novelty, Deleuze, maintains that it does not and that the source of Bergson’s transcendence lies precisely in duration’s privileging of the pure past. In contrast, Deleuze contends that an ontology of the event, understood as eternal return, maintains an absolute independence of the present from the past, establishes time as a true generator of creativity, and completes the contemporary philosophical project of immanence. In contrast to many interpreters who align Deleuze with Bergson, this paper will show how, through his shift to Nietzsche, Deleuze develops an ontology of time that accounts for the contingency and complexity of history without reducing it to mere randomness or accident.
Nathan Widder is Professor of Political Theory at Royal Holloway - pure.royalholloway.ac.uk/port...
Негізгі бет Nathan Widder - Deleuze on Bergsonian Duration and Nietzsche’s Eternal Return
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